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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this interim research report is to develop models 
of the relationship between industrial location and public policy in Kenya, 
to test the validity of these models using empirical data, and to use those 
parts of the models which appear to be valid to help improve policy outcomes. 
The approach will be contextual, in that government interventions will be 
considered in relation to the wider context of overall industrial, spatial 
and population policies, and in relation to the political economy of which 
these-policies are a part. Data have been collected in interviews with 
government administrators, and with officials from 17 textile, knitwear and.', 
clothing manufacturing firms. Data analysis will be based on procedures taken 
from the disciplines of political science and regional economics. 
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 
THE CASE OF KENYA'S TEXTILE 
INDUSTRY 
by 
Clay G. Wescott 
WORKING PAPER NO. 288 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 "nolicy Sciences" Approach 1 
1.2 Population Distribution and Industrial Location: 
a General Theoretical Framework 3 
2.0 INDUSTRIAL LOCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE KENYAN CONTEXT 
2.1 Population Distribution, Migration and Industrial 
Location 3 
2.2 The Evolution of an Industrial Location Policy 21 
2.3 Model of the role of Government in Industrial Location 
decision making 2? 
3.0 '1ETH0D0L0GY 
3.1 Sampling Procedure 39 
3.2 Data Collection 39 
3.3 Data Analysis 
3.4 Dissemination of research results 41 
4.0 FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL LOCATION: ECONOMIC AND PERSONAL 
4.1 Locational factors 43 
4.2 Conclusion 51 
5.0 FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL LOCATION: GOVERNMENTAL 
5.1 Fixed incentives - 54 
5.2 Negotiable incentives 55 
5.2.1 Case no. 1: Duty Remission 56 
5.2.2 Case no. 2: Protection and duty remission 59 
5.3 Conclusion 6 3 
6.0 CONCLUSION 66 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 70 
Industrial Location and Public Policy: the case of Kenya's Textile Industry"'' 
Clay G. Wescott 
Research Associate 
Institute for DeveloDment Studies 
University of Nairobi. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 "Policy Sciences" Approach 
This paper is part of the current movement in social science 
research institutions to develop ne".r techniques particularly suited to 
assist policy makers in developing countries. To an increasing extent, 
social scientists are undertaking research which evaluates the current and 
long term outcomes of policies and events, and is designed in such a way that 
it helps policy makers improve such outcomes, and minimizes the resources that 
mu^t be expended to bring about these outcomes. Policy oriented social 
scientists (who may be called "polic scientists""'") try to achieve these goals 
by developing systematic, critical procedures for evaluating the objectives and 
consequences of policies and governmental activities. Such an approach 
characteristically begins by positing a causal model said to explain a 
particular social process, part of which the government would like to modify. 
Hypotheses implicit in the model are then tested and refined on the basis 
of appropriate empirical data. On the basis of the refined model, correlates 
of desired behaviour are determined, and inferences are made about policy 
altemnatives. Examples of previous interventions in the same or a comparable 
setting are examined. Attempts are then made to answer questions such as: Hew 
many resources of what kind must be expended by the government to achieve 
the desired changes in behavior? Can the government afford this resource 
expenditure? What is the relative effectiveness of fixed policies (e.g. 
investment credit allowance) vis a vis agreements negotiated on an ad hoc 
The author is grateful to the businessmen and government officials who willingly 
agreed to be interviewed in connection with this research project, to D.N. Mongai 
for assistance in the extraction of relevant information from parliamentary 
debates, and to Njuguna Mwangi, Industrial Survey and Promotion Center, Ministry 
of Commerce & Industry, who read a draft of this paper and made many useful comment 
This paper will ultimately be expanded and rewritten as the author's 
PH.D. thesis. The entire research project is being financed by grants from the 
African Studies Center, Poston University, and from the Ford-Rockefeller Research 
Program on Population and Development Policy. 
1. Cf. Lasswell, 1971. 
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basis (e.g. duty remission)? Are sectors that are the object of these inter-
ventions likely to ignore the incentives offered by the government, and refuse 
to alter their behaviour in the desired direction? Hew long will the 
intervention be necessary before the behavior is self-sustaining? 
The following paper is hopefully an example of the "policy sciences" 
approach outlined above. We will begin by reviewing in very broad terms the 
current state of theoretical and empirical knowledge concerning population 
distribution, migration, and the location of industry. We will then posit two 
model3 of social behavior which seem appropriate in the Kenyan context. 
From the point of view of the policy maker, the first model is substantive 
and the second procedural. The substantive model is concerned with the 
determinants of industrial location, and the relationship between this and 
governmental incentives. The procedural model is concerned with the inter-
relationships among variables affecting bargaining outcomes between governments 
and private investors. The hypotheses implicit in these models will then be 
tested and refined on the basis of data on textile manufacturers in Kenya. In 
the case of the substantive model, corrslates of location of textile manufacturing 
firms outside of Nairobi and Mombasa will be identified. In the case of 
procedural midel, examples will be identified of situations where bargaining skill 
on the part of government negotiators helped to achieve certain goals of 
industrial policy. Finally, an analysis will be made of costs and benefits of 
alternative policies and bargaining procedures concerned with influencing the 
location of new manufacturing firms. 
We must emohasize ax the outset what the empirical base and scope of 
this paper are narrow. We are concerned exclusively with location decisions of 
some of the larger textile firms in Kenya. Although it is reasonable to hypothe-
size that the location decision making process is similar in other industries, 
and although in the future we will examine location decisions of firms in other 
industries in order to substantiate this, the fact remains that at present 
our conclusions are subject to inevitable biases resulting from the restricted 
nature of the sanple. Tur analysis of government policies toward:, these firms is 
subject to a comparable set of biases, the strength of which depend on the degree 
to which the government has treated the textile industry differently from other 
indistries. 
In addition to the narrow sampling base, the scope of the analysis 
is also narrow. We are concerned here solely with the qualitative analysis 
of factors which have influenced location decision making, and in particular 
the role of government in this process. have not yet attempted to quantify 
these factors,although we intend to do so in the next stage of this project. 
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'v'e have also not examined the impact of the sample firms on the town/region in 
which they are located, although we intend to do this. Finally, this work 
will only be of use to the government if, as a result, specific projects can 
be recommended for promotion outside of Nairobi and Mombasa. Again, we have 
not yet done this, but intend to do so. 
1.2 Population Distribution and Industrial Location: a General Theoretical 
Framework 
Migration and the resultant changes in the distribution of population 
are a central feature of the modernization process. Much of what are generally 
. 2 considered desirable causes and/or effects of modernization , and much of what 3 
are considered undesirable , can be traced directly to the wrenching away of 
young people from their home, family, and customary way of life in a physical 
as well as spiritual sense. Because of the centrality of this phenomina to the 
development process, there has recently been a great deal of theoretical and 
empirical work in this area using the techniques of many different disciplines. 
The distribution of population in a region or nation is the nesult of a 
combination of cultural, political and economic factors. Although we will 
discuss each of these three groupings of factors spparately for purposes of 
clarity, it will be obvious from our discussion that they are all closely 
interrelated. 
Cultural factors in t e distribution of population have been extensively 
studied by anthropologists, geographers and sociologists . A simple way of looking 
looking at a much more complex situation is that many ethnic groups throughout 
the world have emotional attachments to particular localities. Such attachments 
may reflect a long tradition of settlement in a locality, such as in the African 
rural areas occupied predominantly by one tribe. On the other hand, the 
presence of a core group of migrants from an ethnic group in a locality may 
attract other migrants from that group, which over time may significantly alter pat1 
patterns of population distribution in a region. 
In both cases aspects of the locality become embedded in the mythology 
of the ethnic prroup. Thus, a sacrod mountain or tree becomes the focus of the 
2. e.cr. increased productivity, integration of local with national 
markets, increased factor endowments, development of entrepreneurship. Cf. Uphof-
and Ilchman, 1972, pp. 92-99. 
3. e.T. alienation, immorality, crime, loneliness, NB. Gutkind, 1973. 
Barbour and Prothero, 1961. Moss and Rathbone, 197 5. 
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group's religion, and the landmarks of a city become the focus of the lyrics of 
the group's music. Factors such as these often lead to feelings of exclusive-
ness and intolerance of outsiders, and make it difficult for group members to 
move to other, less congenial areas. 
Groups may originally become attached to these regions for a variety 
of reasons. In the case of pre-industrial societies, they may have .originally--1 
trrigi'artcd because .bfo religious-'reasons s periodic raids or "'conquest by another 
group, ' •'/ a disastrous period of drought, famine, or pestilence, or simply by 
a c'esire for better land and opportunities. After travelling for months, 
years, or generations, they find anew location which is suitable for their 
agricultural and other economic activities, and where they can remain 
unmolested by potential enemies and/or become assimilated into other indigenous 
groups. In modernizing societies, the same types of group migrations may take 
place in order to escape racial discrimination, religious or political 
persecution, and/or to find greater economic opportunities. Thus, cultural 
attachment to locations characteristically evolves out of economic and political 
necessity. However, over time the cultural factors play an importance in and of 
of themselves in maintaining patterns of population distribution. 
Political factors are important determinants of population 
distribution in societies at all levels of development. Political activities 
and policies which affect population distribution and migration may or may not 
have primarily demographic objectives. Thus, military actions may be under-
5 taken explicitly to alter patterns of settlement or may be undertaken primarily g 
for other reasons while having demographic effects". Municipalities may enforce 
7 
restricted ethnic or social class divisions in a community . On the other 
hand, municipalities may be forced to charge high taxes and fees in order 
to finance a certain level of services. These taxes and fees may in turn force 8 
certain resident groups to move elsewhere . government determined wage rates 
may be fixed disproportionately high in certain areas to encourage labor 
5. e.rr. The long standing Arab-Israeli conflict represents an attempt 
by Israelis to maintain their present settlement patterns at the expense of 
Palestinian refugees, and a counter-attempt by Palestinians to eliminate Israel 
settlements and replace them with their cwn. 
6. e.g. The recent civil war in Vietnam was fought primarily over 
ideological and personal issues. However, it also had the effect of altering 
settlement patterns in the southern region, first by the hamlet program of the 
Thieu government, and then by the urban-rural miration policies of the present 
communist regime. 
7. This may be achieved by explicit, apartheid legislation or by zoning 
regulations. 
8. e.g. In many North American cities middle class residents have been 
forced to leave as a result of the high taxes charged to finance welfare payments 
and services for increasing mumbers of lew income residents. 
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9 migration . In addition, wage differentials may be instituted in response 
to differential political influence between sectors. Such differentials will 
likely lead to increased migration from low wage to high wage areas. At the 3am e 
time, low wage areas may become increasingly attractive to new investment, 
which in turn will generate other migration flows. Governments rarely act 
impartially to achieve some idealized norm of pooulation distribution and 
migration. Governments are spokesmen for coalitions of interest groups, and 
must deliver benefits to these groups. Such benefits may include explicit 
attempts to alter patterns of population distribution. Other policies may be 
adopted which have the secondary effect of altering population distribution as 
long as the regime gains more for its key sectors because of the major thrust of . 
the policy than it loses as a result of the secondary effect"^. 
In the preceding discussion of cultural and political determinants, 
we have given numerous examples of interrelated economic factors. These 
economic factors have been the most systematically researched of all the 
determinants of population distribution. Elaborate theoretical models have been 
developed, some of which have been rigorously tested using quantitative empirical 
data collected by economists and economic geographers. A number of propositions 
have emerged from this research which have stood up to empirical testing in 
developing countries"^: 
1) Population distribution and migration are the result primarily 
of rational economic choices. 
2) Increasing levels of modernization act as catalysts and 
facilitators of increasing levels of migration. 
3) The net flow of this migration is from rural to urban areas, which 
in turn results from a large rural-urban movement less a smaller 
urban-rural movement. 
4) This rural-urban migration takes place .in stages. A migrant may 
originate in a subsistence fanning area, move first to a local 
9. e.g. "hardship" wage supplements are often given to workers in 
isolated outposts. 
10. Of course, the secondary effect may not represent a loss at all, but 
rather an unplanned for gain. 
11. Revenstein, 1385 and Lee, 1366, cited in Todaro, 1976; Wescott, 1575; 
El-Shakhs, 1972; Berry, 1971. 
Most migrants to primary cities benefit economically from their 
migration, and probably tend as a result to be politically conservative. 
However, if the children of migrants remain in primary cities and are unable 
to obtain satisfactory employment, they may advocate radical political solutions 
NB. Weiner, 1967. 
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trading center, next to an intermediate sized urban center, 
and finally to a major city. A laborer may stop migrating 
either temporarily or permanently at any one of these stages if he 
is able to secure employment. 
5) A decision to migrate from one stage to the next is likely if the 
combination of wage rate and level of unemployment in the 
destination town amounts to an increased expected income with 
respect to the status quo. 
6) In the earliest stages of development, the level of primacy 
(proportion of urban population in the four largest urban centers 
living in the largest city) may be relatively high' but may still 
increase further because economic development does not occur 
fast enough, or evenly enough, to support large intermediate 
cities. The nature of the colonial experience, the lack of a 
tradition of urban ism, and a small national area are other 
factors that may lead to high levels of primacy. As the level 
of economic activity continues to increase, political 
conflicts between the largest city and its periphery are 
resolved in favor of the periphery. Intermediate cities become more 
economically viable, and begin receiving a larger proportion of 
public resources. These cities, in turn, offer relatively large 
markets for agriculture and industry which leads to employment 
opportunities and modern services for an increasing proportion of 
the rural population. 
7) In some situations there are structural, political, cultural or 
geographic factors which prevent this decrease in primacy from 
taking place, ''here this is the case, there is a disproportion-
ately high level of migration to the primary city, skimming off 
young men from the rest of the country The process of diffusion 
of innovations to the countryside is hampered. Services tend to be 
concentrated in the primary cities, making access by the majority 
of the population very difficult. Job opportunities in the 
primary city do not keep pace with the inflow of job seekers, 
a situation which may create political instability. 
The above propositions point out the importance of the location 
of economic activities in determining patterns of population distribution 
and movement. Thus, theories regarding the location of industry are directly 
relevant in understanding patterns of population distribution in modern or 
modernizing societies. 
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Industrial location theory has developed along two broad lines. 
On the one hand, it is argued that firms locate where they can minimize 
variable costs. Assuming given raw material sources, markets, wage rates, 
external economies, production functions and transport rates a firm will 
12 
select the least-cost location . These theories assume that a potential 
investor has complete information on these variable costs. 
Others have argued that control over market areas is the dominant 
12a 
factor in industrial location . Assuming more than one producer in a 
given industry, each firm will locate so that it controls the largest market area 
possible, given the constraints of variable costs. 
Although these theories are useful as first approximations, they miss 
imoortant subleties of the determinants of industrial location in developed 
countries, and can be outright misleading in understanding the situation in 
developing countries. They fail to consider cases where factor proportions 
and production functions can be altered to take maximum advantage of a 
particular location. They do not consider that differences in demand elastici-
ties between markets may persuade an entrepreneur to locate near to th-®- market: 
with the more elastic demand situation, regardless of variable cost premiums 
that may be necessitated. They do not consider situations whereby raw material 
sources, market/; and transport and wage rate differentials may change frequently 
and dramatically. They do not consider personal, cultural or political factors 
which frequently outweigh economic considerations. They often do not give 
proper consideration to the importance of proximity to financial institutions, 
offices of the central government, availability of reliable sources of transport, 
quality of the labor force, quality of infrastructure and a variety of external 
economies all of which are particularly critical considerations in developing 
• 13 countries 
12. e.g. Hoover, 1948 and Weber, 1929. "Least-cost" theories of these 
and other writers are summarized in Nixson, 1973, pp. 5-10. 
12a. e.g. Fetter, 1924; Smithies, 1941; Christaller, 1966. Losch has 
attempted to integrate both the least-cost" and "market-area" approaches. 
Losch, 1954 cited in Nixson, 1973, pp. 12-15. 
These theories are oriented towards explaining the location of industry 
within a given country or region. There are comparable theories of the global 
distribution of industry using least cost (e.g. theories of comparative 
advantage) and market-area (e.g. theories of imperialism or neocolonialism) 
annroaches 
13. Alonso, 1971. 
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the Kenyan Context 
Vfe are now ready to draw out those aspects of the theoretical 
and empirical work just described which ire relevant to the Kenyan 
context, and to use them as the foundation for a model of the deter-
minants of industrial location and public policy in Kenya. We will also 
develop a model of economic bargaining, which will help in processing empirical 
data regarding the terms of exchange between the Kenya government .and • 
potential investors with particular regard to location,, 
2.1 Population Distribution, Migration and Industrial Location 
There has been a considerable amount of research done in Kenya 
on pittorns an! determinants of population distribution and migrations 
The findings of this research tend to confirm, or at least do not 
disconfirm, the generally accepted propositions cited in the previous 
soction. There is ahigh rate of rural-urban migration* For example, 
the 1969 ccnsus found that 76^ of the population of Nairobi was born 
elsewhere. In 1969, the African population of Nairobi was growing at a 
rate of 15-2^ por annum. Since the rate of natural increase for Nairobi 
13a 
was only a small fraction of this, most of the overall growth rate was 
the result of migration. There is also a high rate of migration into other 
urban centres. Most migrants go first to the town nearest their rural 
residence and they prefer remaining there if they can obtain adequate 11 -I fr 
employment. + Because of pressure on the Ian:'. - , rising agricultural 
productivity, and the attraction of towns, the government cxpects a 
minimum 7.annual increase in urb.tn population up to the year 2000. 
By that time, urban areas will have to accomodate 26-32^ of the 
population (7-3-10.9 million) ar compared with 9.9^ (1.082 million) 
in 1969c16 
13a. The rate of natural increise for Kenya has been estimated it 
•3.3$ based on 1969 census data. -The rate for Nairobi is undoubteclly 
somowhat lowor because of the relatively high level of development, GK 1971a. 
14. ^empel, 1970; Marco, 1967? I.L.O., 1972, p. 46. 
15„ Kenya has one of the highest levels of rur .1 population per sc. km. 
of arable land (678) in the world. This compares with a level of 93 in 
Tanzania, 280 in India, and 543 in Indonesia. 3om, 1972; UN, 1973? F.\.0. 
1971. GK 1971a. 
16. The Government defines "urban area" as a to™ with a population 
greater than 2000*".CK, 1974, p. 114. 
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There is considerable circuit migration in Kenya. This is reflected 
by the fact that most recent migrants to M drobi have not developed a firm 
commitment to the city, in: plan to return to their original rural area 
17 18 when they retire. Migrants are disproportionately male \nd concentrated 
19 between the ages of fifteen and about thirty-nine years. High rates of 
migration have characterized the largest ethnic groups in Kenya (Kikuyu, 
2o 
Luo, Luhya, Kajnbi ) as well as some of the smaller ones (Tharoka, Iteso, 
Nandi, Fokot, Sabaot, Kipsigis, Hlgeyo, Pokomo, Riverine, Swahili- Shiraze, 
and Bajuni'), while low migration rates have characterized other relatively 
small groups (Gusii, Smbu, Mbore, Meru, Tugen, Marakwet, Somali, Galla, and 
Samburu)21. The ethnic diversity of migrants, and the differential migration 22 rates of different ethnic groups are likely to continue in the future. 
Decisions to migrate are influenced by the interrelationship of 
three factors; the influences that push migrants away from their home 
bases (high birth rates, fragmentation of land holdings, increased education, 
high unemployment and underemployment), the attractions of urban areas 
(access to services, more jobs at higher wages, "bright lights'1) and the 
relative ense with which these groups can get from one place to another. 
•ilthough these conclusions have been derived from predominantly qualitative 
studies based on census and survey dita, some of them have been corroborated 
by econometric studies. For example, Huntington found rural-urban migration 
in Keny .'. to be positively correlated with urban incomes and negatively 
correlated with rural ones. Furthermore, he found, that urban wage elasticities 
were higher than rural elasticities, indicating thit high rates of rural-urban 
17. Vengroff, p. 588. 
18. However, the proportion of women and children migrants increased 
between 19A-8-1962, and is likely to further increase in the future. Ominde, 
1968, p. 189. 
19. There is some variation outside of this age range among ethnic groups. 
Ibid, pp. 188-189. 
20. Ibid., p. 189. These four groups combined make up about 5 o f the 
total population. G.K., 1970, vol. 1, p. 69. 
* < 
21. Ominde, 1968, p. 189. The largest of these smaller groups, the 
Meru, make up about 5$ of the population. 
22. The migration rates of certain of the smaller .ethnic groups might 
change in the near future, For example, if transport facilities were improved, 
for the Galla-Somali, their migration rate would undoubtedly increase. 
Substantial increases in world agriculturl1 prices might tend to.lower the 
migration rates for the smaller ethnic groups that produce export crops. 
However, the larger ethnic groups, because of their numbers and the resulting 
pressure on their land, will continue to have high migration rates. 
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migration vd.ll continue except in the unlikely event that rural incomes 
23 begin to increase at a faster rate than urban incomes. The Todaro 
"expected income" model has not been tested in Kenya, although it was 
2/, 
conceived with the Kenyan experience very much in mind, However, a 
"comprehensive and significant test" by Barnum and libot based on Tanzania 
data found that an expected wage variable explained considerably more 25 
variation in rate of migration than the nominal wage rate. Propositions 
regarding the impact of population movement an.I distribution on regional 
development have been confirmed by factor analysis based on official economic 
and demographic statistics. Soja has shown that Nairobi is the major nucleus 
for the generation and diffusion of socioeconomic development throughout 
Kenya. As a result, districts in relative proximity to and having close 
interaction with Nairobi tend to have relatively high levels of'development. 
This pattern is largely the result of the attitudes and objectives of the •O former colonial government and settler population." Extensive rural-urban 
migration compounds these problems by leaving behind very old and very young 
27 people, the uneducated, and Large numbers of women in rural areas. 
This highly uneven pattern of modernization has resulted in a 
situation where three-fourths of the national area is "...functionally not 
part of the Kenya nation...the level of participation is extrememly low 
and, more important, the frequency of internal conflict is such that 
2Q 
the impross of the central government appears weak and ineffective".'" 
Partly as < result of this uneven pattern of modernization, agricultural 
2o • 
production per capita is not increasing. / In addition, the inability of 
large numbers of workers in both rural and urban areas to earn a reasonable 
income may in the long run lead to political instability. 
23. Todaro, 1976, pp. 73-75. 
24. Todaro, 1969. 
25. Todaro, 1976, pp. 73-75. 
26. Boja, 1963. Cf. RLmani & Taylor, 1973; McKim, 1974. 
27. According to one estimate, about a third (400,000) of all 
rural households are headed by women whose husbands are away in torn. 
I.L.O., 1972, p. 47. 
28. 3oja, 1968, p. 112. 
29. F.A.O., 1973. Although the value of agricultural production has 
steadily increased, rapid population growth has prevented any significant 
change in per capita agricultural production. 
30. 'lccording to one study based on 1971 figures, 20f? of adult males and 
50% of females working in N-.irobi ire unable-to earn a reasonable minimum 
income. I.L.O., 1972, pp. 51-64. 
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Patterns of uneaual development in Xenya are evident in Table 
The 1973 Index of manufacturing employment,per_&apita.is by for the highest 
in the four disticts of-Nakuru, Kiambu, Kisumu. and Uasin Gishu-reflecting the 
location of Nakuru town, Thika (and the Nairobi pori-urban area), Kisumu 
town and Eldoret respectively. Of these four dis^^ts, Nakuru has the 
highest index, which is still less than one-third /of Nairobi, and one-half 
that of Mombasa. There is also considerable variation among the four 
-- districts - the index for ftisumu being-aboutone half that of Nakuru. The 
distribution of total wage employment is somewhat less unequal - although 
the leading manufacturing districts were also the leading districts for total 
wage employment. 
This pattern of regional distribution of employment did not change 
considerably during the first 10 years of independence, although there were 
some interesting minor changes. Nairobi's share of manufacturing employ-
ment increased by about 9$» although its share of wage employment remained 
the 3ame. Mombasa's 3hare of both manufacturing and total employment 
declined slightly. Kiambu district registered the most significant gains in 
share of manufacturing (15$ between 1967-1973) and in wage employment 
(28$ between 1963-1973°) Nakuru district registered a 9$ gain in manufacturing 
share (1967-1973) and a 15$ loss in share of total employment (1963-1973)« 
Kisumu district registered a 19$ decline in proportion of manufacturing 
employment (1967-73)? and a 35$ decline in proportion of total employment (1963-73) 
Table B indicates that there were also changes in the regional 
distribution of employment within the urban sector. Between 1967-73» 
the proportion of urban manufacturing employment in Nairobi increased by 
9$, while the total proportion increased by The only other major town 
to register such increases was Thika, where there wore gains in proportionate 
manufacturing (50/) and total (26$) employment. In ill other major towns, 
proportionate manufacturing and total employment remained the same or declined 
during this period. The most striking decline was in Eldoret, which was 
closely followed by Kisumu. 1974 figures on total employment show a 
continuation of these trends. A closer look at the evidence of urban 
employment stagnatiori "outside" of Nairobi "and THik'a indicates that there were 
moderate gains in proportionate employment in Nakuru, Kisumu, and Sldoret 
between 1967-1971, followed by sharp declines. Thus, between 1971 and 1974, 
proportionate urban total employment declined by 25$ in Nakuru, 35$ in Kisumu, 
and 63$ in Eldoret. Likewise, between 1971 and 1973» proportionate urban 
manufacturing employment declined by 15$ in Nakuru, 59$' in Kisumu, and 69$ 


31 in Eldoret. 
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In the following and in future research reports, we will argue 
that this increasing concentration of employment opportunities in Nairobi 
and Kiambu district can be explained both by the nature of the industrial 
location decision-making process, and by the nature of relationships between 
the public and private sectors in Kenya. 
By way of summary, we can now present an interdisciplinary series 
of statements concerning population distribution and. movements in Kenya 
based on widely ..ccepted theoretical propositions .and empirical evidence 
from Kenya; 
1) Patterns of population distribution in Kenya are the result of 
tradition.il patterns of ethnic settlement, regulations and 
restrictions enacted during the colonial period, and the location, 
both historically and at present, of economic opportunities. 
2) Current population movements are primarily the result of 
the location iof economic opportunities. 
¥;U£2 .utiac* d^ iairjflE, '-st ^ jim^iltf +Jia -c^ aiL.^ , rtoAirinioL 
calculations of expected income differentials which take into 
account both wage r itoo m " levels of unemployment. Migration 
takes place between one'.irea•and another if there is a significant 
differontiil in expected income between the two areas. 
1 i 
4) There to two major-migration streams in Kenya, one from 
relatively disadvantaged to relatively advantaged rural areas 
(rur al-rur il) and one from rural areas to small urban areas to 
large urban aroas (rurai-urban). There!are, also smaller counter-
flows in the oppcoito direction. 
5) For economic, cultural, and historical reasons, migrants 
' i ' : in Kenya; tare disproportionately young males belonging to certain 
tribbs. ! j . { I ! ! < 
) i 
6) To a large extent patterns of labour migration in Kenya today 
have been influenced by policies of the coloni al and independent 
31. Although these figures do nqt include the urban informal sector; it 
can be assumed that proportionate employment in the informal sector is roughly 
comparable to proportionate employment in the formal sector in each town. 
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governments, lithough such policies may have had explicit 
demographic objectives, they frequently had other objectives which 
were of primary importance. In some cases the demographic consequence 
of such policies were unintentional. In cases whore potentially 
undesirable demographic consequences were predicted in advance, it 
was decided that the primary objectives of the policy • outweighed 
the unwanted consequences. 
We will take the above statements to be assumptions upon which the 
model of industrial location in 2.3 will be based. This is not to say that 
all of these statements have been empirically verified although some of 
them have, and none of them have been flatly contradicted. 
There ha3 been relatively little research done in Kenya concerning 
the determinants of industrial location, particularly in .comparison to the 
number of studies dealing with the distribution and movement of population. 
However, the work which has been done gives us a general idea of patterns and 
determinants of industrial location. 
The most extensive study of industrial location was done by 
32 
Ogendo and is based on government statistics and personal interviews 
with entrepreneurs involved primarily in agricultural processing and 
fabricating firms with five or more employees during the period 1964/65. 
This study isolated a number of important determinants of historical 
patterns of industrial location in Kenya. 
One of these factors was transportation. Tho existing pattern 
of industrial location has been greatly influenced by the development 
of the rail',ray and road system. Within this transportation network 
the location of individual firms often represents an attempt to minimize tran-
sport costs, either of raw material inputs or of manufactured outputs. 
Ecological and political factors have also influenced the location of 
many industries. The location patterns of certain industries tend to 
co-vary with patterns of rainfall reliability and other climatic 
considerations, availability of water, and high quality agricultural 
land, and the geological distribution of minerals. The location pattern 
of manufacturing industries has also been determined to a large extent 
by the partition of Kenya into "alienated land", "crown land" and "African 
reserves". These industries have tended to concentrate in the former 
32. Ogendo, 1972. 
• • - IDS/[IP 283 
because of the presence of better infrastructure, Larger markets, etc* 
inother important set of locational factors are personal 
considerations. ICntrepreneurs may choose to locate their firms in order 
to be close to friends, family, and social amenities. The reasons for this 
go beyond those of a purely personal nature. Personal considerations 
often havo the effect of reducing costs, (e.g. a personal acquaintance 
with a raw materi al supplier or banker may influence the availability 
of materials or funds) .and increasing revenue (e.g. personal contacts with 
merchants). 
another set of f ictors pointed out by Ogendo ire locational 
related savings in processing costs. Such savings are said to include 
lower, labor costs is the rorult of the '.vail ability of a lacrg» labour 
supply; cheaper and quicker replacement of parts for firms located in 
Nairobi? increased availability of power, fuel,water and. business services 
in the larger towns; lower transport costs when certain industries are 
dispersed rather than concentrated; and marginally lower wage rates and 
a lower frequency of labor disputes outside of Nairobi and Mombasa. It is 
said that most agricultur il processing industries such as the textile 
industry tend to bo market oriented because of the large savings in the 
transportation of the finished product. It is also argued that in most 
cases there .are sot of location f ictors for each firm, rather than • 
one factor, an I that there is rarely on "optimum" location for a plant since** 
conditions may chango so rapidly. Furthermore, firms often knowingly choose 
a sub-optimal location, rather than spend the time and money to find a 
marginally bettor one. Because the difference in benefits between locations 
is generally small, this behaviour on the part of firmr; is perfectly 
33 rational. 
Wo will examine the validity of these conclusions in section 4, 
which is based on our empirical findings. However, one general comment con-
cerning them is appropriate here. \1though the study provides a very 
useful doacxiption of Kenya*s industrial geography, it is less useful . 
than it might bo from a policy point of view because there is little :analysis 
regarding the relative importonce of different factors. In order to design 
33. Ibid., pp. 6l, 67-68. 
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efficient policies (i.e. policies which .chieve the maximum results it 
the minimum cost in terns of the government's resources) we need to hive 
a sense of "hich location .1 fictors re the most critic .1 ones in "'hich 
industries. Incentives can then be designed which make these critical 
factors more attractive at selected locations. 
Q J 
\nother study wag. .conducted by Wixson between 1965-7, uvi was 
based on "ritten responses to a questionnaire from a cross section 
of large manuf acturing firms, followed up by person il interviews in the 
cases of some Nairobi and Mombas t bisecl firms. llthough Nixson's focus was on 
the equitable allocation of industrial projects throughout the East African 
Common Market, .some of his analysis is also relevant to the problem of 
industrial dispersion within Kenya. Tixson's conclusions regarding locational 
f ctors are similar to Ogendo9s. Beyond this, Nixson argues against tlx 
incentives and in favor of direct subsidies as the government's most effective 
means of promoting industrial dispersion. 
A more recent but much less extensive study was based on interviews 
35 
with firms in Thika, Nakuru, and Kisumu. . The..basic conclusions were, 
very similar to the previous studies in that a number of different factors 
were pointed out r.ith little indication of their rel itive importance. 
One factor was mentioned which was not brought out before— the importance of 
"political factors". We will discuss more about these factors shortly. 
.\nother study is currently underway at the Ministry of Finance and 
36 
Planning. Up to now, this study has been based primarily on data, collected 
by the Ministry of Labor, consisting of . tabulation of manufacturing 
firms in Kenya in June, 1975. This study provides a useful overview of 
relatively recent patterns of industrial location. Dat i tabulations 
from this study are summarized in Tables C, .D and E. The following general 
conclusions are evident: 
l) Manufacturing activities are heavily concentrated in Nairobi, 
•and to a lesser extent, in intermediate sized totma 'and in the 
Nairobi peri—urban area. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
Nixson, 1973. 
Parmeno, 1971. 
Norcliffe, 1975 and 1976. 



~~ - ~ IDS/WP 288 
2) Most primary raw material processing firms are located 
close to their principal inputs. 
3) High value-odded industries are concentrated in 
Nairobi primarily to take advantage of infrastructure and 
linkages with other industries. 
4) Market oriented industries are distributed throughout 
the country, with the largest plants located in the largest 
market: Nairobi. 
5) The only industries which up to now have been genuinely 
footloose are those in categories D and Since a large 
proportion of the urban workforce is dependent on m.anufac-37 
turing, it is argued that the next development plan should 
outline an industrial location policy, including the iden-
tification of footloose industries, .and industrial projects 
suitable for towns other than Nairobi and Mombasa. 
2.2 The Evolution of .an Industrial Location Policy 
In order to understand present government policy towards industrial 
location, it is useful to outline demands on the government which have 
brought these policies about. 
There are two different types of demands that have been made. On 
the one hand, politicians have complained about patterns of industrial 
concentration in Kenya. For example, in 1966 the M.P. and perennial 
government critic Mr. Shikuku (Butere) complained that the Minister 
for Coqjmerce and Industry, Mr. Kiboki (presently the Minister for 
Finance*and Planning), was responsible for centralizing all now industries 
in the Nairobi area, extending out into Kiambu district as far as Thika. 
This to Shikuku was enough to call for a Cabinet reshuffle. ."We are 
all here to build the nation and it is not to be built on one side", 
38 he said. 
37» According to a crude estimate made in this study, at least 
UOfo of the urban workforce is either directly or indirectly dependent 
on manufacturing. 
38. House of Representatives Official Report, X, 4th session, 
6 October, 1966, cols. 472-5. 
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There his been a steady flow of complaints from other parliamentary 
critics regarding the excessive concentration of industry in Nairobi and 
Thika and the resultant outmigration from rural areas to these towns.^ 
As Mr. Moss (Mt. Elgon), the Assistant Minster for Power and Communication, 
put it: 'The nearer the bone, the sweeter the meat1... Therefore, it's only 
those in Nairobi who are benefiting (from the government's industrialization 
policies)".^0 Other M.P.s have criticized the government for the limiting 
1 -1 
of industrial estates to a few towns, the plight of 'backward' districts and 
42 tribes, and the lack of a planning team in the Ministry of Commerce 
i.3 •and Industry responsible for decentralizing industrial projects. 
There are obvious ethnic overtones to the criticism of industrial 
concentration in Nairobi and Thika (predominantly Kikuyu areas, particularly 
the latter) by politicians from other (non-Kikuyu) regions. However, it is 
significant that accusations of tribal favoritism have generally not been 
explicitly a part of this debate, unlike for instance the debate on 
allocation of government jobs in the mid 60s.^ ": 
The other type of complaint characteristic of the political debate 
on industrial location concerns industrial developments in particular 
constituencies. Factories ire important political symbols, even if. they -
do result in a relatively small number of jobs in comparison with the number 
39. Mr. Odoyo (Nyakach), Nation :1 \ssembly Official Report, XXXVII 2nd 
Session, 14th Februiry, 1975, cols. 271-3. T'r. '\nyona (Xitutu East), 
Mr. Mbole (ivoti South), .and Mr. Murgor (Eldoret South), standard, 10th 
September, 1976. 
40. National Assembly Official Report, XXF7II, 2nd session, 12th 
February, 1975, col. 1C5. 
41. House of Representatives Official Report, Mr. Omweri. (Wonjare-South 
Mugirango), X, 4th session, 6th Octobcr, 196&, gols. -513-5.16. ^ 
42. Mr. 01 e Lemein (Narok South), National Assembly Official ReportV' 
XI, 5th session, 21st February, 1967, cols. 219-S2. ~~ ... 
43. ?tr« Muliro (Trans Nzoia), House of Representatives Official Report, 
X, kth sossion, 6th Octobcr, 1966, cols. 480-3. 
.44. The latter debate concerned the disproportionate numbers of Kikuyus, 
and to a lesser extent Luos, who were receiving appointments and promotions 
in the civil service. For a brief review of"this debate, see Rothchild, 
1969. For general background information on the complex role of 'tribalism' 
in recent Kenyan politics, see Rothchild, 1969, and Leys, 1975, PP« 198-206. 
One reason for the 1ack of an explicit tribal content in the debate 
on industrial location is that many different tribes have 1 stake in the 
large manufacturing sectors of Nairobi and Mombasa. „Thus,. the issue of 
industrial concentration in these towns vis vis the rest of the country 
is not clearly divided along tribal lines. 
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of job seekers. Thus, politicians are continually asking officials from 
the relevant ministries why a certain factory (usually based on locally 
available raw materials) has not been built in their area. MP's have 
45 
argued that a pencil factory should be built in Thompson's Falls and 
Kitui45*, a vegetable dehydration plant in Kisii, a vegetable canning 
factory in Sagana4''', etc.4** 
45- Mr. G.G. Kariuki (Laikipia West), National Assembly Official 
Report, XI, 5th session, 5 April, 1967, col . 1984. A pencil factory 
was eventually built in Nairobi in 1974. 
45a. Mr. IvUti (Kitui South), National Assembly Official Report, XXXVII, 
2nd session, 20 February, 1975, col. 439. 
46. Mr. Omweri (Wanjare-South Mugirango), House of Representatives 
Official Report, X, 4th session, 6 October, 1966, col. 516. The' 
vegetable dehydration factory was eventually built in Naivasha in 1968. 
47. Mr. Warrithi (Othaya-South Tetu), Ibid., col. 509. A new 
-reg^table canning factory has not yet been built. 
47. Mr. Kamuven (Baringo East) called for the decentralization of 
the dairy industry in his province, Ibid., cols. 511-2; Mr. Mati 
(Kitui East) asked for a castor seed factory in Kitui, National 
Assembly OfficialReport, XI, 5th session, 4 April, 1967, col. 1900; 
the District Commissioner for Laikipia asked for a meat processing 
plant in NanyukL, Daily Nation, 26 January, 1973, p. 5; Mr. Kurgat 
(Kerio-Kusini) asked for a cement factory in Eldoret or Nyaru, National 
Assembly Official Report, XX&V, 5th session, 12 July, 1974. col. Ill; 
Mr. Owala-Orwa (Homa Bay) asked for a sugar factory in South Nyanza, 
Ibid., col. 615; Mr. Moss (Mt. Elgon) proposed a starch factory in 
Kitale and a textile mill in Busia, Ibid., XXXVII, 2nd session, 
12th February, 1975, col. 185-6; Mr. 'Onyango-Ayoki (Kisumu Rural) 
called for the development of sisal, groundnut and cotton based 
industries in his area, Ibid., col. 225; Mr. Mate (Meru) called for 
a tea factory in his area, Ibid., XXXVII, 2nd session, 25th Februarys 
1975, col. 502-3; Mr. Amin (Wajir) asked for a meat factory in Wajir, 
Ibid., XXXVIII, 2nd session, 27 May, 1975, col. 720-2. 
These are only a few representative examples of such 
requests. 
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Politicians have also complained that particular factories 
built in Nairobi or Thika should have been buj.lt in their area since /, Q raw materials would be closer at hand/ or that a factory originally 
n q 
planned for their area might be relocated for political reasons. In 
some cases, constituents m y complain directly to the government about 
the location of a particular factory. For instance, there was a well-
publicized case in which Kisii farmers threatened to stoo growing 51 
pyrethrum to protest a decision by the Pyrethrum Board, to expand its 
processing plant in Nakuru rather than to build a new one in Kisii. 
Farmers protested that they had"hot" been consulted regarding the decision, 
and yet were assessed, a levy-to help p.*y for it. Farmers might have 
carried out their threat if President Kenyatta had not met with them, 52 cancelled the lev/, and convinced them to keep on growing the crop. 
A more veiled form of criticism are the questions put by M'.P.s 
to the government concerning its plans for the development of certain 
53 ' ' 
underdeveloped districts. There is also direct criticism of the 
government because of the lack of industries and/or infrastructure in 
49. g. These have been complaints about the corn, cob processing-
plant being built at Ruarika rather than Kitale, Daily Nation, 1G January, 
1973. See ...lso Daily Nation,20 January, 1973 ^  p « T In .another example, 
Mr. Anyona (Kitutu East) has complained that/passion fruit processing 
fruit firm built a new factory in Thilcrather than expanding the existing 
one in Sotik. As a result, many workers in Sotik allegedly lost:their 
jobs. National Assembly, Official Reportf ax. 2nd session, ,22nd April, 
1976, cols. 2150—2. 
50. Mr.-Oduya (Elgon West), IJou.o of Representatives Official Report, 
X, 4th session, 6 October, 1966, col. 501. . . . 
51. At the time, Kisii farmers were responsible for about 2/3 of total 
national production of this valuable export crop, according to tlae 
Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Nyagah. Daily Nation,20 \pril 1973, p. 4. 
52. Daily Nation, 15 March, 1973, p. 15? Ibid., 7 April, 1973? 
id., 11 p. 4; Ib T\ April, 1973; p. 9? IbitU, 20 April, 1973, Mr 
Ogero (West Mugirango), Nat 
session, 6 Vpril, 1973, col 
ional Assembly Official Report, XXIX, 4th 
L. 31-? Ibid.f 19 april- 1973, col. 690. 
In this meoting with the Kisii management committee of the 
Masaba Former's Cooperative Union, President Kenyatta .<lso promised th^t 
any future levies would-be preceded by consultations with pyrethrum 
growers. However, it was agreed that the expansion of the Ntkuru 
factory should bo continued as planned. Standard, 27 June, 1973, p.l. 
53. Mr. Godhia (Hamisi) ro. industrialisation of Kakamega town, 
National Assembly Official Report,.XI, 5th session, 16 February, 1967, 
cols. GG—9? Mr. Omwori (Wanjare-South Rigirango) re. industrialization 
of Kisii town, Ibid., 7 \pril, 1967, cols. 2264-5? Mr. Mbai (Kitui South) 
re. industrialization of Kitui district, Ibid., col. 2229. 
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particular areas. The dearth of factories in agricultural areas .has 
55 been criticized as hindering agricultural production. These criticisms 
may be accompanied with threats of increased crime or political agitation 
56 in the region concerned if the situation doesn't improve. 
Finally, there has been some limited critioism from urban based 
politicians concerning the human cost of industrialization in their consti-
57 tuencies. 
The government's response to these criticisms also falls into 
two categories. The characteristic response to a specific request/ 
complaint regarding the development of an industry or industries in a 
given area is to state that such a development is under consideration, 
58 or that It is technically or economically unviable. However, there 
54. Mr. Kitonga (Kitui East) re. Kitui district, Ibid., XXXVII, 2nd 
session, 7 February, 1975, col. 80-2$ Mr. Said (Mombasa North) re. the 
mainland north or Mombasa, Ibid., col. 83. 
55. J.M. Kariuki (Nyandarui North) was one of the few M.P.s to 
argue in parliament for a factory outside of his own district—-in this case 
a sugar factory in Bondo, Nyanza Province, Ibid., XXXV, 5th session, 31 
July, 1974, col. 616-8. 
56. Mr. Godia (Hamisi) ended his plea for the industrial development 
of Western Kenya by threatening; "if this i3 not done, then there is a 
saying which states, 'The devil finds work for idle hands to do'...which will 
not be.good for the country. Ibid., XI, 5th session, 24 February, 1967, col. 
431. In the same debate, Mr. sftikuku (Butero) asked if the"government was 
trying to drive the people of Western Province to become like the Shifta 
rebels of Northern Kenya, Ibid., cols. 431-2. Mr. Khayoya (Bungoma South) 
added that Western Kenyans had a long history of agitating against 
colonialism. For example, in 1948 the people of this region threatened 
to become part of Uganda, thereby forcing the colonial government to grant 
a seat in the Legislative Assembly to the region. Thus, he concluded, 
"...if it is a question that we must act before the Kenya government can 
do something, then we know how to act..." Ibid., col 439-40. 
57. Mr. Mwaro (Mombasa West) has complained that industrial expansion 
has led to the eviction of people from their land. Ibid., XXXVII, 2nd 
session, 19 February, 1975, col. 349-53. 
58. Mr. Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Ibid., 
XI, 2nd. session, 7 April, 1967, col 2265? Mr. Kibaki, Minister for Commerce 
and Industry, Ibid., col. 22295 Mr. Wood, A:st. Minister for Commerce and 
Industry, Ibid., XXXV, 5th session, 12 July, 1974, col. Ill; Mr. Nyagah, 
Minister oTTiri culture, Ibid., XXWII, 2nd. session, 25 February, 1975, 
col. 502-3; Dr. Kiano, Minister for Commerce and Industry, Ibid., H 
March, 1975, col. 899; Asst. Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Mwicigi, 
Ibid., XXXVIII, 2nd session, 27 May, 1975, col. 720-2. 
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are a few cases of projects implemented in a particular region at least 
partly in response to political pressure from that region., Such 
projects may be relatively unattractive according to conventional 
financial criteria, and depend on special concessions from the govern-
59 ment for their survival. 
The government's response to criticism regarding overall 
patterns of industrial location has been a number of tentative steps towards 
developing an industrial location policy. The initial responses were 
expressions of concern at all levels of government, coupled with an 
unwillingness to retard overall economic growth by making unprofitable 
60 
investments in less developed regions. The government pointed out ' 
that there were limits to its ability to influence the location decisions 
of private investors, which in turn had to be based on considerations of 
location economics.01 Since"'tK'eri"/"the 'g6verriftient''h*'i'S' experimented with 
a variety of incentives to promote industrial decentralization, including 
special funds for less developed areas, tax.revenue transfers, 
industrial estatesrogional minimum wage differentials,^ industrial 
59. e.g. Paper mill recently built in Wobuye, Western Province. 
60. GK, 1965a, p. 47? GK 1966, p. 35? President Kenyatta's opening 
speoch to the 6th Parliament, Ibid., (IV, 6th session, 26th February, 
1968, col. 3?' B.H. Ogola, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
East African Standard, 12 April, 1968;National Assembly Official Report, 
Xfil, 5th session, 17 October, 1967, cols.' 803-6; House of Representatives 
Official Report, X, 4th session, 11 October, 1966, cols. 653-4. all the-', 
preceding cited in Rothchild, 1969, Of. a later commcnt by Mr. Mwicigi 
(Kandara), Asst. Minister for Agriculture; "I cToh't know the reasons why 
some people want some of the industries at Thika to be shifted to • their 
area3". National Assembly Official Report, XXXVII, 2nd session, 13 February 
1975, col. 236-7. (translated from the original Swahili). 
61. Mr. Kibaki, Minister for Commerce and Industry, Ibid.,XI, 
5th session, 5 April, 1967, col- 1985? Mr. Mboya, Minister for Economic 
Planning and Development, Ibid., 16 February, 1967, cols. 88-9? Mr. Womao, 
Director I.e.D.C., Daily Nation, 16 January, 1973, p. 5*. 
62. The Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Service's has had such 
a fund, East African Standard, 10 February, 1967. 
63. For a while, 50< of the Graduated Personal Tax collected in 
Nairobi and Mombasa (less 50$ of collection costs) was transferred to 
rural county councils. National \ssembly Official Report, XIII, 5th session, 
18 December, 1967, col 3461'. However, this practice was abolished shortly 
after Margaret Kenyatta became Mayor of Nairobi. 
64. GK, 1969, p. 325? CK, 1974, p. 295-7. 
65. GK, 1975, supplement No. 28, 26 May. 
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survey and promotion services, and investment credit allowances. In 
addition, a hierarchy of growth centers have been designated on the basis 
of regional physical plans as having priority for the development of 
68 services and infrastructure. In this regard, the ourrent development 
plan includes targets for investments in urban infrastructure in the major 
69 designated growth centers. 
Thus, since independence there has been a steady flow of 
criticism, primarily from Parliament, regarding the location of 
industry in Kenya. The government has responded to this criticism with 
statements of commitment to the principle of industrial decentralization, 
and a variety of incentives intended to facilitate this end. 
In the following section, a model will be presented for evaluating 
the effectiveness of this response. 
2*3 Model of the Role of Government in Industrial Location Decision Making 
Our model of the role of government in industrial location 
decision making is derived in part from the conclusions of the preceding 
Kenya studies, and in part from the received general theories. 
The classical "least-cost18 location models depict a partial 
equilibrium situation. Locations are selected which minimize average 
costs by minimizing variable average costs (e.g. transport costs and 
70 
wages). A typical model is pictured in figure 1. It is assumed that 
the principal input for a firm is available at N. Thus, assuming constant 
wages, locational related costs are minimized at C^  on the f±rtD*s space 
cost curve AC . Governmental incentives and disincentives in support o 
of industrial decentralization are generally formulated with this model 
in mind. In figure 1, incentives (e.g. tax credits, incentives and. 
tariff remissions, transport subsidies) are offered to firms located at 
66. GK, 1969, p. 315; CK, 1974, p. 294. 
67. Budget speech delivered to the National Assembly on 15th June, 
1975 by the Hon. Mwai Kibaki, Minister for Finance and Economic Planning. 
6«. E.g. GK, 1970a. See also GK, 1974, p. HWt-7. 
69. G.K. 1974, p. 123. 
70. Cf. Jones, 1974, p. 550= 
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distance D or greater from N, which have the effect of lowering the firm's 
space cost curve to AC..,. The firm can now expect to make a smaller 
profit (Ft less C) in N than in locations between L^ and L^, and between 
L2 and L^ o Thus new firms will choose to locate in these outlying regions. 
The government can achieve the same result by enacting disincentives (e.g. 
high minimum wage rates, high municipal taxes) for firms located in N, 
which will raise the firm's space cost curve to \C0. Profit maximizing 
firms will choose to locate at some distance greater than or equal to D 
from N. The exact location will depend on whether or not incentives 
are offered in addition to disincentives. In many industries, firms would 
expect to generate different levels of revenues at difforent locations. 
' 71 This situation is depiotod j_n figure 2. For every peak on the space 
revenue curve AR, there is a spdco cost curve AC. In the example shown, 
a profit maximizing firm will locate at N because: 
An incentive offered for location outside of N would lower AG~ to AC_, , Rb Rb" 
and AC^to-AC^. The firm would now locate at L^ becauses 
^ - V > (RN - CN}' (Ra -
These- models, ere no doubt appropriate for Kenyan industries 
with unusually high transport co3t components. However, empirical 
research conducted in Kenya and other developing countries outlined 
above suggests that this'. cl4flsi'c«lr modelsin many ways misrepresent the 
actual location decision-making process of most firms. A reformulated 
version of the original model from figure 1 is pictured in figure 3. 
This new model focuses on perceived average costs (PAC) rather than 
AC, the difference being thatj 
AC = f(T1?W) + FC - I 
PAC = f(T2,W, p, e, o, i,) + FC - I 
Where T1 = transport cost calculated as cost of shipping X materials 
or goods Y distance. 
71. Cf. Ibid., p. 452. 
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W = Wages 
?2 = T^  adjusted, to take into, account costs associated with 
reliability of transport, 
e = environmental factors (e.g., water, climate) 
p = Cost reducing personal considerations (e.g. access to credit 
or raw material supplies? concessionary terms? sales agreements 
with local distributers.) 
i = payments for infrastructure (electricity, sewerage, communication) 
including costs associated with reliability) 
0 = other variable costs (e.g. cost and ease of repairs, cost of 
investigating alternative locations in money and time, 
opportunities forgone because remote location makes contact 
with government officials difficult) 
FC = Fixed costs — everything not included as variable costs 
except government incentives offered for particular Ivcations. 
1 f Incentives offered by tho government for particular locations 
(NBo Negative if a disincentive) 
It is assumed in this model, as in classical "least-cost" location 
theory, that there are fixed markets t'hich firms compete for. "Market area" 
location theories do not seem to exolain the location of most large textile 
72. projects in Kenya. 
Certain characteristics of this model are different from the 
original one. First of all, the horizontal axis of tho revised model is 
a norrrin.qj scalo, while the original one was ordinal. The reason for 
this is that wo expect that firms do net evaluate alternative locations as 
a direct function of distance from an ideal location, but as a function of 
many different variables which may or may not reflect distance. Thus, 
may bo closer to N than L2, anc yet still be & less desirablo 
location than Another different, feature of the revised model is that considerable discretion is allowed in the computation nfjariable costs. There is no obvious method of computing costs connected with 
reliability, opportunities forgone, and production delays. Each firm 
will compute those costs differently, and place greater emphasis on some 
than on others. 
72. The utility of ^ market-area" location theory in explaining the 
location of small scale industry will be examined in a future paper, 
where we will discuss the generation of backward and forward linkages from 
largo industrial projects. 
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The revised model depicts tlTo alternative perceptions of average 
cost characteristic of firms in developing countries. PAC defines the 
situation where one location is overwhelmingly favoured because of certain 
perceived cost differentials. These differentials are most commonly the' 
result of cost—reducing personal considerations, although they may be enhanced 
by other factors such as transport or infrastructure reliability, external 
economies, neod to maintain close contact with government officials, otc. 
Locational incentives offered to such firms will have a negligible effect, 
since the resultant cost curve PAC^ still overwhelmingly favors location 
at N. 
A vory different perception of average cost is depicted by P • A.C, 
The relative flatness of this cost curve indicates that such firms 
perceive that average costs vail not be enormously different at a number 
of different locations. These firms have certain limited criteria that 
they use in selecting a location. The first location that satisfies 
these criteria, and doesn't have any overwhelmingly negative feature, 
will generally be selected. 
In figure 3, an incentive is offered to firmr: who perceive their 
costs to be of the form P'AC and are located at distance d. or greater from 
N, thus lowering their cost curves to PHC^. Perceived costs at any location 
L1 ~ ^ 10 n o w be less than or equal to costs at N. Thus, i firm may be 
induced to locate outside of N. As pointed out oarlier, L^ - L1Q will be 
different for different types of firms. In some cases, they may consist of 
urban centers relatively close to Nairobi, perhaps bounded by Nakuru to 
the west, Nyeri to the North, and Machakos to the oast. In other cases, 
they may consist of all urban centers throughout Kenya which can provide a 
given level of electricity or water. 
Thus, there are throe types of firms which locational policies 
will affect. Firms which behave according to the classical '''least-
cost transportation" model can bo induced to locate in preferred areas if 
relatively large incentives are offered. Firms which compute cost curves 
resembling PAC cannot be persuaded to locate outside of a given area for 
any reasonable amount of government subsidy. We would expect that the 
most a subsidy would accomplish in these-cases would be to persuade a 
firm to locate ju3t outside the city limits of a preferred torn (i.e. 
if subsidies are available to firms which locate in "ruralt; areas). In 
the final case of firms with cost curves approximating P'AC, it would seem 
that a relatively minor governmental incentive would be sufficient to induce 
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location in x preferred area. However, this will only take place if tho 
PAC curvc is raovod downwards. This, in turn, ••rill occur most efficiently 
if incentives reduce the costs perceived to be significantly location related.. 
Thus, if a firm perceives the cost in time and money of evaluating a number 
of different locations as the most significant location related cost, the 
government would do better to assist in and directly subsidize such 
evaluations rather than to offer tax incentives. In other situations, a firm 
may bo willing to incur additional costs at a suboptimal location if the 
government idll offer a compensating subsidy such as duty remissions on 
imported inputs. 
Locational policy alternatives should be evaluated with these 
throo different types of firms in mind. It is also useful to view the 
relationship botwoon government ind private firms as a continuous bargaining 
situation, part of which relates to location. Such a point of view or 
73 model is based upon certain assumptions; 
:L) Each bargaining agent (e.g. firm, government, financial 
partner) controls elements involved in exohanges between them, 
and tho elements controlled by one agent are desired by another 
(e.g. firm controls amount of capital to be .brought into 
country, government controls level of protection). 
2) Bargaining may bo either explicit (e.g. a firm agrees to 
locate upcountry in exchange for a certain level of protection) 
or tacit (e.g. government has a general policy of looking 
favorably on firms that locate upcountry). 
3) There are common as well as conflicting interests among 
participants. 
k) Systematic and carefully defined bargaining concepts will 
bo useful in the critical evaluation of bargaining encounters, 
and ultimately, in improvirig bargaining skill and bargaining 
outcomes. 
According to such a model, each bargaining agent is aware that 
there are costs and benefits attached to any exchange? although it is often 
difficult or impossible to measure and comp.re these costs aid benefits 
73. Cf. Schelling, 1968, pp. 21-52, 83-118; Coddington, 1968, 
pp. 71-80; Curry & Wade, 1968. 
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each agent attempts to do so in a rational manner and to bargain for the 
most preferred cost-benefit ratio attainable. A critical variable in 
bargaining power is the ability to bind oneself via irrevocable commitments. 
On the other hand, there are cases where negotiated agreements require some 
coordination of participant expectations, such that neither side expects 
the other to retreat. Such coordination is often possible around outcomes 
which are prominent, unique, simple, and/or have a precident, rather than 
around less distinguishable outcomes. 
Bargaining models are illustrated in figures L and 5. In figure 
4, Ab corresponds to N in figure 3, aB corresponds to Lr, and AB corresponds 
to L-^ 2' respect to space cost curve PAC. Assume that those are the 
only three locations available to a firm, .and that A, B and a,b define the 
costs perceived to be significantly location related by the firm. Bach 
bargaining partner attempts to maximize welfare by moving as far as 
possible along its respective axis. 
According to bargaining theory if the government can. commit itself 
first to B, the firm will choose to locate at aB, since this is a more 
desirable location than AB. On the other hand., if the firm can commit 
itself to A first, the government will permit the firm to locate at Ab, 
since this is also a more desirable location than AB. We assume that 
both the government and the firm view AB as a suboptimal location. From the 
firm's point of view, such a location would result in reduced profits. 
From the government's point of view, such a location would result in fewer 
taxes collected and the danger of bankruptcy or higher consumer prices in 
the future. In terms of this model, we would hypothesize that there are 
many cases where the government can commit itself to B either as part of 
an overall location policy, or as a position taken during pre—investment 
negotiations. In such cases, firms will willingly locate in aB, both 
because aB is preferable to AB, and. because the firm was never really 
committed to Ab in the first place. In many cases, Ab was simply the first loca-
tion found which ortiafied the. firm's minimum requirements, >.B is likely 
to prove equally suitable. Firms will only be successful in committng 
themselves to b if there is some prominent reason for a particular 
location (e.g. an essential raw material is only located there) or 
against other locations (e.g. electricity supplies are inadequate). 
.Another way of looking at this bargaining process is shorn in figura 
5. Indifference curves for government and a particular firm show the preferred 
mix of x and y, which might stand respectively for effective level of protection 
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granted to the firm, and government investment in the firm by way of equity or 
loans. Given that bargaining starts at point \, government can optimize its 
position at 3 (i.e. reach a more favorable indifference curve), while tho 
firm will be no worse off at that point. On the other hand, the optimal 
position for the firm is at C, at which point the Government will be no worse 
off than at A. Thus, bargaining will take place within the triangle ABC. 
Actual bargaining is more complicated than this, since there are 
always other variiblos under dispute, such as location. For example, a 
firm might agree to locate in a certain location if the government would 
reach an agreement at C. 
Wo can now summarize the assumptions from which our modelsof industrial 
location and public policy »re> constructed: 
1) Migration and resultant patterns of population distribution 
are highly dependent on location decisions made by private 
businesses. 
2) Decisions concerning location(are primarily concerned with 
minimizing costs. 
3) Location decisions are influenced by bargaining between 
government officials and firms. 
On the basis of these assumptions, we have derived the following 
hypotheses to be tested: 
1) There are at least three different methods of computing costs 
on which location decisions may be based. 
2) Firms are generally concerned with a limited number of criteria in mak-
ing locatiorj&ecisions. In some cases, one location i3 overwhelmingly 
favored in terms of these criteria. In most other cases, a number 
of different locations would be acceptible. In such cases, firms 
usually select the first location which satisfies these criteria, 
since firms are unwilling to; sacrifice time and money for the 
possibility of finding an optimal location. 
3) Government incentives may affect location decisions by 
altering space cost curves; however, incentives are often 
inefficient and/or marginally effective because they influence 
costs not psrceived by firms to bo the most important ones, 
because they may work at cross purposes, and because certain types 
of firms perceive that their costs in suboptimil locations would 
be unacceptibly high. Thus, incentives will be most "cost-effective'1 
if they are tailored to influencing firms who perceive their space-
cost curves as being relatively flat. 
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Our model views the relation between government and. industry 
as a continuous bargaining situation, part of which relates to location,, 
Self-interested policy makers agree to make exchanges with businessmen 
and vie? versa. For example, policy makers may be willing to forgo 
collecting certain taxes in order to increase the level of investment 
in rural areas. However, businesses may be willing to locate in rural 
areas only if they are given preferential duty remission in addition to 
tax concessions. Both sides will eventually compromise on some inter-
mediate position. Either side will agree to an exchange if as a result 
they will end up in a more preferred position with respect to their goals 
than they would have been in if they had not made the exchange. Government' 
officials may attain locational and other objectives through the skillful 
use of bargaining techniques, including the use of irrevocable commitments, 
threats, premises, and tacit coordination. These basic ideas make 
it possible to analyze the complex detcrminanta and effects of industrial 
location policies. 
\ 
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3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Sampling procedure Formal interviews are being administered to firms 
selected from the population of all agricultural processing and manufacturing 
firns in ISIC two-digit classifications 31, 32, 33 and 34. Firms are being 
selected from this population based on stratified sampling techniques. 
In the first phase of the inquiry, the sample has consisted of 17 
firms with fifty on more enployees selected from ISIC four-digit classi-
fications 3211 (spinning, weaving and finishing textiles), 3213 (knitting 
mills) and 3220 (weaving apparel). These industries have been selected 
because they are relatively footloose, labor intensive, and have the potential 
75 
for generating significant backward and forward linkages . Smaller fimins which have 
have been set up as a result of large firms in the sample will be interviewed 
at at later date. ^ 
In the second phase, not yet begun, firms will be selected from ISIC 
3311 (saw mills, planing and other wood mills), with special emphasis on 
firms producing wood products such as pre-fabricated housing materials. A 
Canadian consulting group has recently prepared a proposal for the Ministry 
of Housing to develop such firms in selected high population density regions 
76 
of the country . VJe will evaluate the prospects of such a development with 
respect to our model of industrial location. Firms will also be selected for 
interviewing from ISIC 3113 (Canning and Preserving of Fruits and Vegetables), 
3115 (Manufacture of Vegetable and Animal Oils and Fats), 3116 (Grain Mill 
products) and 3121 (Manufacture of food products not elsewhere classified). 
On the basis of research discussed in 2.2, the above industries are 
ideally suited to be located outside of Nairobi and Mombasa. If we find 
during our interviews that these firms are encountering considerable difficulties 
resulting from their upcountry location, then the prospects for the decentral-
ization of other industries are dim. However, if the firms in the sample are 
viable in their 'upcountry location or believe that they would be viable 
(in the case of Nairobi and Mombasa based firms), then the urospects for 
decentralizing these and certain other types of firms are more favourable. 
3.2 Data Collection Because the final recommendations relate the endogenous 
forces influencing geographical distribution of jobs and people to policy 
variables such as tax incentives and government subsidies, data collection 
proceeds along two parallel tracks: one concerned with the decision process 
'5• In 1973, firmr. with 50 or more employees accounted for 83.7% of wage 
ernoloyment in manufacturing, and 98. 5% of wage employment in the textile, 
industry (ISIC 3211, 3213). Computed from data in GK, 1975. 
75. Kendev, 197 5. 
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used by firms in choosing a location, and the other concerned wit) the 
resources of and restraints on the Kenyan government, and its resiltant 
industrial location policies. 
Data on location decision making is primarily collected during 
interviews with officials of sarrole firms. My initial approach is via letter, 
which is followed up in a few days with a telephone call. I tryto reasure 
businessmen that I am not a government official, and that facts btained will 
be considered "on background". Soma businessmen are still relucant to 
provide proprietary information that could be useful to competitc?s. I have 
tried to design interview techniques which minimize this problem. I have also 
attempted as much as possible to cross-reference interview respon.es with each 
other and with public records, to dctect inconsistencies. Interview responses 
have also been compared with feasibility studies, correspondence letween firms 
and government, and interview responses of government officials irvolved in 
pre-investment negotiations. 
I have conducted-most of iry interviews with-the most senior official 
available, who is usually either the managing director or the general manager. 
In most cases, this official was with the company when the location. decision 
was made. In many cases, ho was primarily responsible for making t.-e decision. 
Often I have also interviewed the chief accountant and one of the production 
man age rs. 
Some data on industrial policy arc collected during these interviews 
with businessman. In addition, I am talking with individuals knowledgeable 
about the administrative capability of the Kenya bureaucracy and the political 
constraints upon this bureaucracy such as appropriate officials of the Central 
Organization of Trade Unions, the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
the Federation of Kenya Employers, the Nairobi City Council, the press, and 
relevant governmental agencies.(e.g. Office of the Chief Economist, and the 
newly established regional offices of the Ministry of Finance and Planning; 
Physical Planning Department, Ministry of Lands and Settlement; Industrial 
Survey and Promotion Center, Ministry of Commerce & Industry; Kenya Industrial 
Estates, Ltd., Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation). 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Analysis is being carried out in two stages. First of all, hypo these 
are being tested qualitatively on the basis of interview responses. Interview 
and other data will then be.coded, and used to quantitatively test hypotheses. 
At this stage, only qualitative tests have been made. Although it • 
is difficult to specify exactly how our hypotheses should be tested, certain 
guidelines are clear: 
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1.) We have suggested that location decisions are based on a limited 
number of criteria. The validity of this should become apparent from the 
77 
responses to questions concerning locational factors . It is important 
to note how quickly and emphatically the official lists the important 
locational factors. Does he list a couple of factors without hesitation, 
or does he hedge? And if he hedges, does this reflect the fact that a large 
number of factors were taken into consideration, or that he doesn't remember 
which factors were important, or that hri is reluctant to admit which factors 
were inportant? 
2.) It is suggested that firms generally do not believe that the marginal 
differences between an optimal location and an adequate location warrant the 
expense of finding the former if the latter is already available. The 
responses to questions concerning comparison of alternative locations are 
relevant here. If firms do not conduct thorough evaluations of alternative 
locations, this would lend support to our hypothesis. The responses to these 
questions should also indicate whether or not firms rank alternative locations 
as a function of distance from an ideal location. 
3.) If the preceding hypotheses are confirmed, we would expect that our 
hypothesis concerning policy would also be confirmed: namely that for certain 
types of firms relatively minor governmental incentives, would be sufficient 
to induce industrial decentralization; however, if the same incentives are 
offered to other types of firms, the incentives will be ineffective, and nay-
work at cross purposes. 
4.) Hypotheses on the importance of bargaining between business and government 
to location decision making will be tested in selected case studies of 
bargaining encounters. The comparative utility of alternative bargaining 
strategies will also be examined in these case studies. 
3.4. Dissemination of research results 
This study is being carried out in cooperation with the Industrial 
Survey and Promotion Center (ISPC)5 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and 
with the Project Planning and Evaluation Unit (PPEU), Ministry of Finance 
and Planning. 
The study is in accordance with the ISPC circular of 5th February, 
1976 entitled "The Planning Process in KenyaM which points out that policies 
affecting the location of industry must be coordinated with an overall 
77. Parts of the questionnaire have been adapted from the questionnaire 
used by Malinowski and Kinnard, 19fil. 
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industrial policy. This document states: 'These new problems (i.e. population 
explosion, rural-urban migration, and unemployment) call for a re-orientation 
of the planning strategies without sacrificing economic growth; a balance has to 
be struck between (a) concentration of industries at growth poles and geogra-
phical dispersion (b) capital intensive or labour intensive, (c) large or 
small industries (d) traditional or appropriate technology use1'. 'y research 
project also concerns policies intended to affect industrial location in the 
context of overall industrial policy. 
This project is also in accord with one of the goals cited in the 
1974-78 Development Plan: "To encourage the expansion of several large towns 
.in addition to Nairobi and Mombasa, thereby providing more alternatives for 
the absorption of the migrant population and avoiding the^problems arising 
77a from excessive concentration,in these two towns." 
Research results will be fully available to ISPC, PPEU, and any other 
interested governmental institutions. 
My project will also link up w.ith the broader research effort 
currently underway at Boston University, which is addressing the following 
issues affecting African countries "(1) the economic, social, psychological, 
and political eonsequences of alternative population distribution patterns -
particularly "ith respect to urban concentration; (2) forces affecting or 
determining individual and family migration decisions; (3) determinants of 
private business location decisions; (M) determinants of public sector facitity 
location decisions; (5) the administrative framework for formulating and 
implementing spatial and urban policies; and (<5) reciprocal relationships 
between politics and policv making and implementation with respect to spatial 
78 distributions of activity." 
Thus, my rorearch /ill be iart of a much larger effect "'to make 
reasonable predictions concerning the effects of alternative policy measures 
on spatial distributions of population and activity and to make normative 
79 
judgements about the relative desirability of different spatial patterns" 
both in the particular case of Kenya, and in the wirier African context. 
77a. GK, 1974, p. 119. 
78. African Studies Center, 1975. 
79. Ibid. 
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4.0 Factors in industrial location: economic and personal 
4.1 Locational factors 
Before discussing the factors of industrial location, it is 
important to understand the method of location selection. Only one textile 
firm of all the ones interviewed claimed to have conducted a formal survey 
of many different locations, during which operating costs and market conditions 
were systematically examined. In the case of this firm, the General Manager 
spent 6 months first examining locations within a 25 mile radius of Nairobi, 
and later, at the insistence of the government, examining other locations 
throughout the country. His procedure was to visit the local branches 
of Barclay's and the Standard Bank in each community under consideration, and 
80 
to ask the bank managers for tips and contacts . After going through this 
process a number of times, he began eliminating"locations from consideration 
because of various negative factors, particularly the problem of waste 
disposal, until only one possibility remained. 
In all other cases, no formal study was made comparing different 
locations. Most businessmen felt that the cost of such a study in time and 
money was not justified. Concerning the former cost, it should be remembered 
that there are a number of different producers in this industry, making it 
more competitive than other industries in Kenya. Thus, it was generally felt 
desirable to get into production as quickly as possible in order to gain a 
foothold in the market before a competitor did. However, this desire to 
get into production did not always result in the absence of formal studies. 
For example, the only firm which conducted a formal study was also the most 
outwardly concerned with "beating out the competition" in the form of another 
new mill. 
Another example of the importance of time as a locational constraint 
was the example of a firm that started production in Nairobi in 1959 . In 
1964, the firm was able to purchase a large consignment of second hand machinery, 
with which to significantly increase its production capacity. They had 
planned to move to a larger site for some time. Now, however, they had to find 
a site with buildings already there in which to store their equipment. When 
they heard that the site of an old chemical company, then bankrupt, with 
10,000 sq. ft. of buildings on it was available in Thika, they took it almost 
immediately. 
These bank managers proved to be extremely helpful, since the 
prospect of a large textile mill in their community promised a considerable 
increase in their business. 
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It should be clear in the following that many firms claim to 
have considered two or three different locations before choosing their present 
one. These locations tended to be well known ones such as Mombasa, and were 
rejected for various negative reasons. These firms were not merely trying 
to minimize costs, but to find a location which met certain criteria. When 
such a location was found, it was selected. It was not felt that it would 
have been worthwhile continuing to look for an optimal location. With this 
in mind, textile manufacturers gave a number of different reasons to explain 
the location of their respective firms. Although no single factor emerged 
as the most important locational determinant for the industry, certain factors 
were clearly more important than others. 
Surprisingly, some of the locational factors suggested by industrial 
location theory turned out to be of marginal importance. For example, one 
might expect that the supply and cost of labor would be a significant locational 
determinant as it is for this industry in other parts of the world. However, 
this was often not the case. One mill located in Mombasa, told us that most 
of their unskilled workers come from the Kisumu area, and most of their 
skilled workers are Kenyans who have left jobs working in textile firms in 
Uganda. The officer interviewed said that he could have obtained such workers 
just as easily if his firm had been located elsewhere in Kenya. Furthermore, 
the official believed that a textile mill located in a smaller town would 
not make significant savings in labor costs. Although wages might be 
initially low at such a factory, t e establishment of other, neighboring 
firms would eventually drive wages up. Wages would also tend to go up as the 
Tailors' and Textile Workers Union pressed for a uniform national wage 
structure . Such a pattern is already evident in Table F, which gives a 
sample of current minimum wages in the textile industry. In all but one case, 
these wages are between 355/- and 365/-, regardless of location. 
There were sonvi cases where labor considerations were admitted to 
be a factor in plant location. A Thika mill told us that Nakuru and Eldoret w 
were rejected as potential locations in part because it was not clear that an 
adequate labor supply would be available. Furthermore, one of the reasons 
for their selection of Thika rather than Nairobi as a location was that at 
the time the location decision was made there was a considerable wage differen-
tial between the two towns. Another firm also mentioned availability and cost 
* Including housing allowance. In some cases, wages for new recruits are 
somewhat lower for first 3-6 months of employment. 
Source: ^age agreerrents between textile firms and Tailors and Textile 
Workers' Union. 
of labor as reasons for their location in Thika. Still another firm told us 
that wages currently paid to the bulk of the labor force in their factory 
located in Kiarribaa (12 miles from Nairobi city centre) were 19-25% lower than 
they would have to be in Nairobi, and that the housing situation for the work 
force was greatly simplified. However, these factors were not the primary 
reasons for the location of this factory. A firm intending to produce 
synthetic fibers has said that one of main factors considered in choosing 
Thika as a location was the presumed availability of skilled labor because 
of the proximity of other large textile firms. However, this presumed advan-
tage may be less important than they think. For one thing, if this firm 
joins the Textile Manufacturers Association, it will be subject to an agreement 
that member firms will not try to entice trained laborers away from other 
member firms. In addition, one government official interviewed believes 
that many of the laborers working in Thika mills are becoming increasingly 
careless in theirwork, and that a new mill would probably do better to train 
its own workers from scratch. Labor considerations were an important factor in 
the location of another upcountry mill. In this case, a large number of 
potential locations was narrowed down to a choice between two locations. A 
major reason for the selection of one of these v/as the relatively homogenious 
ethnic composition of that community, in contrast to the other. It was felt 
that as a result, there would be less friction between laborers, particularly 
m the event of political unrest in the country. This factor was of particular 
concern to the firm's general manager, who played a major role in making the 
decision, since he had previously been stationed in Nigeria during the civil war. 
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One upcountry firm noted that it had considered as a locational 
factor the fact that there were 500 workers in fhe community who were just 
completing work on the construction of a new air field, and would be available 
for work in the mill. ,;.'his firm noted that it preferred not to hire laborers 
who had experience in the textile industry in Kenya, since these workers 
would have become used to working at a very low efficiency. The firm would 
rather hire inexperienced workers, and train them on the job, at a nearby 
polytechnical college (e.g. for basic electrical and engineering skills), or 
overseas (e.g. for highly specialized textile production skills). \ final 
case where labor considerations were a locational factor, although not the 
most important one, was a garment manufacturer in Nairobi. This was the only 
8 ] 
firm visited with an African managing director. The firm does not belong 
to the Textile Manufacturer'a Association, which the director believes to be 
a "cartel dominated by Indians", and involved in a variety of malpractices. 
Thus, he freely "pinches" skilled laborers from nearby mills. In fact, he 
told u3 that it is a mistake to train people because it is so much cheaper to 
"pinch" them. He said that one of the reasons for continuing to do business 
in Nairobi was the availability of trained laborers that could be "pinched7*, 
but that even in Nairobi there was a shortage of laborers with the types of 
skills that his firm requires. 
Another locational factor that one would expect to be important 
based on industrial location theory is proximity to sources of raw materials 
and/or markets. Tlvi textile industry, and particularly some branches of it 
such as the clothing industry, are conventionally though of as market oriented 
industries. This is sometimes the case in Kenya, but not always. 
The reason for the market orientation of this industry is not 
generally transport costs. Admittedly, it is cheaper to ship finished cloth 
or clothing than raw materials. For example, a Mombasa firm told us that 
their raw materials underwent an average 20% weight loss during the production 
process. Since raw materials were primarily imported, transport costs could 
be minimized by locating in Montasa. I'he synthetic fiber firm considered 
Mombasa as an alternative site primarily because of savings in raw material 
transport cost and fuel oil price differentials (which reflect transport cost). 
However, the Mombasa location was rejected for othor reasons. Another 
upcountry firm also felt it would significantly save on raw material 
is costs by locating in Mombasa. It/b^lieved it would also save on equipment 
and spares purchases in Monib as a, which tend to be available at relatively lower 
f —— 
81. This director is a civil servant worxing at the Treasury. He started 
- 47 - IDS/WP 288 
prices both because of lower transport costs and lower markup. Yet, in this 
industry overall, transport costs only amount to an avera^a 1.3%. of total oo 
costs . Such costs are generally not a significant locational determinant. 
Access to certain transport facilities was also mentioned in some cases. 
Most of the firms used their own trucks for the bulk of their shipping require-
ments. This arrangement was thought preferable to use of commercial truckers 
or the railways because of lower costs and greater reliability. Some of 
these firm used the railways for bulk, lonn; distance shipment of raw material 
inputs, and these firms tended to be located next to a railway siding. The 
importance of access to major roads and rail facilities was one of the reasons 
why every factory in the sample is located in or near a major town. 
Although some firms admitted that they try to purchase cotton from 
8 3 ginneries as close to their factory as possible , proximity to ginneries was 
never mentioned as a significant locational determinant. In fact, most mills 
in Kenya cannot rely on any one source of supply because of production 
84 shortfalls, and changing requirements for a particular grade of cotton due 
. . 85 to changing production mixes. 
The same would seem to apply with regard to supplies of intermediate 
goods. For example, a Nairobi weaving concern obtains its yarns from two 
Nairobi mills: one in Nanyuki, and one in Kisumu. The choice is determined 
not by prdximity but by the type of yarn required for the current mix of 
production. 
82. Calculated from 1967 data on "made uo textiles except clothing" 
industry. Costs include all inputs, labor, interest and depreciation. In 
com-oarison, transport costs make up an average 3.1': of total costs of all 
manufacturing and repairs industries according to the same data. ~5K, 1972a. 
83. A Thika mill, which obtains 50% of its cotton in Kenya, tries to 
buy as much of this as possible from a nearby ginnery in Kitui. Another firm 
has invited officials from a local ginnery to visit their mill, at which time 
these officials were urged to increase their production. 
84. Because of increasing cotton consumption by Kenyan mills and correspon-
dingly small increases in output of local ginneries, Kenyan mills are having 
to import increasing amounts of foreign cotton. A large part of this comes 
from Mwanza, Tanzania at the moment, which has rjnlacod Uganda as the major 
foreign supplier. Mwanza cotton was until a few years ago shipped across Lake 
Victoria by boat. However the boat is currently not operating because of 
problems in the East African Community, so that Mwanza cotton must be imported 
via Dar es Salaam/Mombasa. This uncertainty of source of raw material supplies 
is one of the reasons why the textile industry in Kenya has not been raw 
material oriented. 
85. Tanzanian cotton is primarily BR grade, while Kenyan cotton tends to 
be the higher quality (longer staple) AR grade. Many firms blend the two of 
these in varying proportions depending on the demands of the market. Thus, 
changing requirements of particular grades of cotton add an additional 
uncertainty concerning source of cotton. 
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Proximity to markets was most important for clothing and knitwear 
manufacturers, and of some importance to firms engaged solely in spinning and 
weaving. \ Nairobi based firm said that in their line of knitted cloth, style 
may oliange every 15 days. Since most of their customers are garment 
manufacturers from Nairobi, and since customers prefer to come to the factory 
to specify their requirements rather than to work through a travelling 
salesman, it is important for the plant to be located in Nairobi. The 
official said that if the firm had been located away from Nairobi, machinery 
would often lie idle while waiting for customer orders. On the othor hand, 
in Nairobi, the nlant is currently operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
A Nairobi garment maker sometimes sells a large proportion of its 
output outside of Nairobi. However, the rural markets are erratic, and are 
expensive to service because of •higher expenses and commissions for salesmen 
and the high frequency of bad checks. Thus, the firm nrefers to be located in 
•iairobi, so as to hotter service this more dependable market. 
A Nairobi weaving mill produces bedspreads and towels primarily for 
the Nairobi market, and to a lesser extent for Central Province. Officials 
felt that for marketing and other reasons, the firm could not survive if 
located a significant distance from Nairobi, unless administrative and sales 
offices were maintained in Nairobi. How ver, this was not thought feasible 
for a relatively small firm such as this, 'ferny other firms mentioned the 
ease of servicing a variety of markets from their location. Thus, a Thika mil. 
noted its central position with regard to its three biggest markets of Nairobi 
Mombasa, tnd the Ki tale area. A Nairobi clothing manufacturer found 60% of 
its market .in Nairobi, ind the rest spread out like spokes of a wheel in 
Mombasa, Ki.sumu, Cldoret, and Nanyuki. A lairobi spinning mill found Nairobi 
a central location not just for servicing the Kenyan market, but for its 
export markets (35% of sales) in Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, Somalia, Zambia and 
Germany. Nanyuki Textiles was thought to be well situated to cover both the 
Nairobi market, and th- markets close to Nanyuki such as Nyeri and Enibu. Only 
one firm producing yarn and woven cloth told us that access to the local 
87 market was a primary locational consideration. 
Thus, a central or nroxinato location with respect to markets was 
considered desirable by toxtile firms, and was most critical to certain 
86. According to the managing director, 1/3 of total sales are made 
outside of Nairobi during the worst of times, md 2/3 during the best periods. 
87. According to the firm, CO-?;* Qf oil^s are in the local Nyanza 
province. The official interviewed believed that because of long standing 
ties with distributors, that the firm would retain its share of the local 
market despite the new competitors which are entering the field. 
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clothing and knitwear manufacturers. However, in many cases market access 
did not seem to be a dominant locational factor. Firms located outside of 
Jairobi were able to maintain a hold on the lucrative Nairobi market by 
maintaining a Nairobi sales office and/or through local agents. Firms 
located in or near Nairobi tended to be there for other reasons of equal or 
more inportance than access to markets. 
Two locational factors - water and climate- were of considerable 
inportance to many of these firms. Large amounts of water are necessary 
for bleaching, washing, and dying. Moderate temperatures and humidity are 
also desirable. All of the Thika mills mentioned the availability of ample 
water supplies from the Chania River as a critical locational consideration, 
although one firm complained that the price was rather high and quality only 
"adequate". One of the reasons the- synthetic fiber firm rejected its * 
alternative Mombasa location was the scarcity of water in that town. 
Many mills also mentioned the importance of climate as a locational 
factor. Three upcountry firms said that they considered Mombasa as an alternative 
location, and one of the primary reasons for rejection in all cases was the 
high airconditioning expenses that would have to be incurred because of 
excessive heat. 
Another locational factor that occasionally came up was thf 
availability of spares and repair facilities. For example, two Mairobi 
firms stressed the importance of reliance on Nairobi based engineering firms 
for spares and service. However, most of the larger firms found that they 
3 8 
had to keep their own spares in stock,' since even in Nairobi they could 
only buy rudimentary items such as bolts, nuts, and boarings. Most of these 
firms also did their own renal r work, although they made use of local wood-
working and metal shops when possible. 
Finally, in most of the cases of locally owned and managed .firms, 
the primary locational factors were personal ones. Most of these firms were 
owned and managed by Asian families that had lived for generations in Nairobi 
8 9 
or Mombasa. ' These entrepreneurs started with retail or wholesale businesses, 
and developed a network of business contacts. When the decision was made to 
go into manufacturing, there was never any thought of moving. 
38• One firm said that it kept eighteen months worth of spares in stock. 
During the colonial period, Asians were not allowed to purchase 
Land and operate businesses in territories designated as 'white preserves', 
hen Asians purchased firms located in such areas, they would have to dismantle 
them and set them up again in some other area. This explains the concentration 
of Asian firms in towns such as Nairobi and Mombasa. Swainson, 197G, p.40. 
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The Asian owners of a Nairobi firm started with a clothing shoo on 
Government Psoad, Nairobi. After receiving a quit notice, they started a 
yarn importing business. From this they moved to cardigan production, and 
from there to fabric production. Tneir customers continued to be people they 
had known for many years. Although most of them cams from Nairobi, some of 
90 them came from other tov/ns such as Nakuru. 
Another Nairobi knitting mill was also built up from a small 
operation in Nairobi. Although in retrospect it might have been better to 
have built the plant in the peri-ar^an area to take avantage of lower costs 
and greater room for expansion, it was now felt that it would be too expensive 
and too risky to move. 1 
Another weaving firm is also located in Nairobi because of long 
standing family ties. They have considered renting their premises in Nairobi 
and moving to Kiambu (10 miles from city centre) to obtain more space, lower 
costs, and cooler tenperatures. However, they have not done'this because 
they are afraid that Asian entrepreneurs would not be welcomed by local govern-
ment officials. 
Another firm was established by a group of Asians and an African. 
For masons of cost and climatc, Kiambia and Kikuyu, both within the Nairobi 
peri-urban area, were chosen as alternative locations. Kiambaa was eventually 
chosen because the African partner wanted the firm to be in his home (Kiambu) 
district. 
A Mombasa firm started out as a garment making concern run by an 
old Mombasa family. 0v>r the years, the firm has developed into an integrated 
spinning and weaving mill. Respite the problems of heat and water supply, 
the owners have no plans to break personal and family ti.es in Mombasa and 
move elsewhere. 
One exception to the pattern of personal considerations dominating 
the location decisions of local firms is the case of a Thika mill. This firm 
is a joint venture between a local Asian businessman, and sore Japanese textile 
concerns. The Asian initially preferred Mombasa as a location, since he already 
90. On the day we visited the firm, a-garment manufacturer had come down 
from Nakuru to order some knitted cloth. Although the same cloth is made in 
Nakuru, he preferred to deal with his personal acquaintance at this firm. 
91. Manufacturing firms in Kenya must apply for* and receive a licence 
from the government every year. Last year, tho Asian managing director and 
owner of this firmdidnot receive his licence renewal on schedule, ^ and had to 
cut back on production and lay off many of his workers until the situation was 
clarified. Under such conditions of uncertainty, ho is not prepared tx? 
undertake any expansion or change in location of his business. 
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had a blanket and garment manufacturing firm in that town. However, it was 
decided that the climate was unsuitable, and the firm went to Thika. 
One compromise that many of the large, foreign owned firms have 
made is to maintain a Nairobi office. We have already mentioned the existence 
of sales offices in Nairobi. Many firms also have the offices of their top 
°>2 
management in Nairobi. ~ The reasons given for this included the need to be 
in constant touch with financial and governmental institutions, and the 
need to work closely with the sales office. Ono firm was managed by a Nairobi 93 
based management company. It is also likely that the same types of personal 
considerations that persuaded Asian businessmen to locate their firms in 
Nairobi were factors in persuading the predominantly expatriate executives of 
upcountry factories to set up a Nairobi head office. Although these men did 
not have long standing family ties and business contacts in Nairobi, like the 
Asians, they were attracted to Nairobi for its relatively sophisticated urban 
amenities. 
It should be pointed out that the three integrated textile mills 
most recently built in Kenya have all been located well outside of Nairobi, and 
all have their top management working at the factory site. One firm owned 
and managed by a group from India has all its top management working at the 
factory site. The top management of another firm prefers to work upcountry 
because they find they can work much moro efficiently than they would be able 
to in Nairobi, where they would be constantly interrupted by visitors and 
telephone calls. From a purely personal point of view, these men said they preferred 
living in a rural area, away from the bustle and problems of the city, and close 
to good hiking and fishing territory. This is not surprising, since many 
businessmen in Europe and North America also prefer working in rural areas for 
the same reasons. 
•+•2 Conclusion On the basis of the preceding evidence, what conclusions can 
be drawn as to the validity of our model of industrial location? First of all, 
the overriding importance of personal considerations was confirmed. In 
92. In such cases, top executives, accountants, salesmen, and their staff 
are generally based in Nairobi. Production managers and staff are always based 
at the factory site. 
93. Interestingly, the acting managing director, employed by the management 
company, 'was a member of the Asian family that originally owned and managed the 
firm. 
This firm was the only one in the sample whose location was opposed 
'Y a segment of the community. Local European farmers made an unsuccessful bid 
to halt work on the factory on the grounds that it would take all the water 
from the local river and replace it with effluent. However, these objections 
were overruled by the town council, who viewed the prospect of the creation 
of 700 jobs as the most important consideration. This situation, again, 
parallels very closely the Europe an-1 lorth American experience. 
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the cases of many of the Asian run firms, these considerations were purely 
personal (e.g. always lived in a particular town, desire to be close to 
family, desire topartake of amenities in the town) as well as cost reducing or 
revenue increasing. In terms of our model, many locally owned and managed firms 
never seriously considered any other location besides the one selected, which 
was chosen for primarily personal reasons. In ruch cases, it is 
reasonable to believe that the location decision was made on the basis of a 
cost calculation of the form PAC in figure 3. In most of these cases, firms 
chose to locate in Nairobi and Mombasa. Such location decisions could not have 
boon influenced by any realistic level of government incentives. 
Personal considerations were less important in the case of expatriate 
firms, in part because the top management of these firms often had their 
offices in Nairobi. Howover, most of the firms with head offices in Nairobi 
had factories located within 25 miles of Nairobi, primarily in Thika. Such 
locations were chosen in part so they would be easily accessible to the head 
office. These and other firms in the sample would seem to have calculated 
locational related costs of the form P'AC in figure 3. Such firms were 
generally concerned with a limited number of criteria (e.g. quality and 
compatibility of labor force, wat :r and climate) in making location decisions. 
The first location found which satisfied these criteria, and has no overwhelm-
ingly negative characteristics, was generally the one selected. Firms believed 
that once a location had been found which satisfied these particular criteria-, 
it was not worth the time and expense of searching for othor locations, since 
the possible advantages of such locations would be marginal. 
It would seem that locational incentives offered by the government 
to such firms could be effective, particularly if alternative locations 
nroposed by the government satisfy for the most part the key criteria 
nerceived by firms to be important. Thus, an effective locational policy 
must include a component designed to meet the requirements of particular types 
of firms. 
The unwillingness of firms to conduct extensive locational studies 
is also relevant to policy makers, and makes the work of organizations such 
as the Industrial Survey and Promotion Center absolutely critical in achieving 
the government's locational objectives. Once vo have a good idea of the 
particular costs that potential investors are trying to minimize in selecting 
a location, the ISPC can conduct studies of the characteristics of particular 
regions and/or urban areas which at first glance seem as if they would be 
attractive to a particular investor or group of investors. Reliable estimates 
could be made of resource accessibility, ; t.- availability, cost and feaszbilir 
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of adapting infrastructure to the needs__of particular industries, characteris-
tics of available labor, and cultural and personal amenities. Where particular 
bottlenecks are discovered which are likely to be deterrents to potential 
investors, the ISPC could act as a catalyst to removing these bottleneck. In 
doing this, particular care should be taken to distinguish between the 
absence of some feature as a bottleneck, and the reasons for the absence of 
the feature as a bottleneck. 
In some cases, a bottleneck may prove to be insurmountable, such as 
the case of the problem of waste disposal in Nakuru, Gilgil, and >Iaivasha 
for industries producing relatively large amounts of effluents. In such eases, 
industries with low waste disposal requirements could be encouraged. In 
other cases, it may be feasible to remove a bottleneck, such as the case of 
water supplies in Mombasa. 
In any case, the results of our interviews with firms suggest that 
the government can influence location decisions-in. situations where personal 
considerations are not the dominant locational factors. If an investor is 
presented with a convincing argument that an alternative location will 
satisfy his primary locational criteria, and if he is offered incentives to 
compensate him for increased costs, the investor will be very likely to choose 
that location, rather than be bothered with looking around for a marginally 
better one. 
These rather general comments will serve as an introduction to the 
next two sections, which are concerned with the role of bargaining betweeen 
governmennt and private businesses in industrial location, and with tentative 
guidelines for the development of an effective industrial location policy. 
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The Kenya government t ikes an active role in encouraging industrial 
developments in the loss-developed regions of the country. Decentralized 
industrial development is viewed as a means of labor absorption in rural 
areas and intermediate sized towns, and as a catalyst to the overall 
modernization of rural economies. There ire also political pressures 
for the promotion of industrial projects in particular areas, .at; discussed 
in 2.2. 
The following will outline policies and governmental actions which 
may have an effect on industrial location, and give examples with reference 
to the textile industry. Those governmental activities will be divided intc 
two categories: those which provide fixed incentives for industrial 
location, and instances where the government negotiates with firm? for 
locational objectives. Both typos of incentives will bo examined from 
the porcpoctivo of the bargaining model outlined in 2.3. To what extent 
are fixed incentives an effective bargaining strategy from the government13 point, of vieWjln .negotiations with firms, does the government bargain in a rational manner for the most preferred cost-benefit ratio 
attainable? Does the government and/or firm make effective use of 
irrevocable commitments? Do participants in bargaining situations 
tend to coordinate expectations around prominent outcomes? IJhat inherent 
advantages does each participant hwo in those bargaining situations? 
Those are the types of questions that ^ ill be dealt with in this section. 
Our aim i s to help improve the bargaining s k i l l of government negot ia tors 
through a c r i t i c a l ^v aluation of b lrgaining encounters. 
5.1 Fixed Incentive* 
In his budget speech of 12th June, 1975, the Minister for 
Finance md Planning restricted the 2CFi investment allowance for 
industrial buildings and manuf acturing machinery to firms located outside 
of the municipalities of Nairobi and Mombasa. Most of the firms 
interviewed wore aware of these new allowances, but no firm claimed 
95 that investment credit was a significant locational factor. 
95. Aside from the apparent ineffectiveness of this incentive to the 
textile industry, it may also encourage firms to substitute capital for 
labor, which would conflict i-ith the government's desire to increase employment. 
As a possible solution in this case, the government could introduce a new ta,c 
.allowance linked to changes in employment. Firms which increased their emplo r-
ment would be granted tax rebates, while firm;- <-ri.th decreased employment would 
be assessed tax premiums. Such a policy would discourage the subntituion o: 
capital for labor resulting from the investment allowance,which could^in turn 
bo continued as a possible incentive to firms to locate outside of Nairobi 
.and Mombasa. 
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Variable minimum wage level policies ore another example of a 
fixed incentive to encourage industrial .'ispersion. Minimum wage laws 
provide for three levels of w-gos: the highest wages (300/- per month 
minimum) .re paid to workers in Nairobi and Mombasa, the next highest 
(275/- per month minimum) in intormodi -,to sised. towns such as Thiki and 
96 
Kisumu, and the lowest (175/- per month minimum) in '.11 other regions. 
Although there are some examples slxcadydiscussed where 1 factory was 
located outside of Nairobi because of the differentials in officio! 
minimum wages, such firms tended to bo located in the Nairobi peri-urb in 
ire: rather than in one of the intermediate sized towns. In this way, 
firms could remain close to Nairobi for person.il and administrative 
reasons, and yet still take advantage of the wage differential. Needless 
to say, the location of a firm just outside of tho Nairobi city limits 
made an insignificant contribution to tho government's goal of industrial 
dispersion throughout the country. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
many firms could not take advantage of these differentials because they 
were locked into uniform wage contracts by the Textile Worker's and 
Tailor's Union. 
5.2 Negotiable Incentives 
Aside from incentives offered to all manufacturing firms, 
there are also incentives granted on an ad hoc basis, as a result of 
bargaining between businesses, financial partners, and government. 
.'"•:• * •• . . Some of these incentives have a direct 
bearing on location decisions, while others may affect such decisions 
indircctly. Incentives generally represent promises that cortain favors 
that will be granted after the investment and location decisions have 
been made. Sometimes explicit promises are made by government officials 
to firms. In other cases promises ire implicit; that is, firms are led 
to believe that if they comply with government policy objectives ouch 
as locating outside of Nairobi and Mombasa thoy will be given favorable 
treatment by the' government regarding negotiable issues such as protection. 
We will point out instances where the government has not lived up to 
promises made to firms, aor at least thought-to-be made as far as the 
firms are concerned. We will consider such instances a bargaining 
strategy of making false promises, and 'ill evaluate the effectiveness 
96. GK, 1975, supplement no. 28, 26 May. 
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of such a strategy in ^ ohieving desired btrg.lining outcomes for the 
government. In a future paper, we will compare the government's effectivencs 
in achieving location objectives with its success in achieving other 
goals of industri il policy such as export promotion, selection of appropriate 
technology, non-exploitative management agreements, Kenyanizatlon, and 
favorable corporate financial structures.. 
5.2.1 Case .No. 1; Duty Remission 
One upcountry knitwear firm was established by a loc^ .l Asian 
family, and located in the community where the family had been involved 
97 
in textile distribution and sales for the previous forty-five years. 
Although there were personal reasons for selecting the location, there 
were economic reasons against it. A list of those disadvantages was 
presented to tho Ministry of Commerce and Industry during the pre—investment 
negotiations. When the firm went into production, it tras granted 50t 
duty remission on imported inputs. This duty remission was allowed 98 
to continue for eight years, after which it was revoked by the government 
on the grounds that the firm was no longer an infant industry, and thus 
should bo able to compote without remissions. 
Tho firm appoiled this order on the grounds that the order would 
create a c ir,h flow problem, that competitors with relatively more capital 
intonsive production processes were"still receiving 50-100' remission, 
and that tho order would jeopardize 80 current jobs and an expansion 
plan that would have resulted in up to 500 additional, jobs. The firm 
also claimed that it had been persuaded by the government to Icoate up-. 
country, although the firm would h.tve preferred to be in Nairobi. The 
firm believed that the duty remission had been offered as compensation 
for locational disadvantages, and should therefore be continued. An 
Industrial Protection Committee (i.P.C.) subcommittee prepared a lengthy 
evaluation of the merits of this appeal, and recommended that duty 
romission be reinstated for one year only. However, the I.P.C. as a whole 
decided to reject tho appeal. 
97. Information on this .rnd the following case study has been amassed 
from interviews ^ -dth officials from the firms concerned, and from govern-
ment officials involved in negotiations vdth the firms. 
98. GK, 1975, supplement no. 20, Legal Notice no. 54 dated 25th April. 
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We have described above a series of bargaining encounters between 
the government and an upcountry textile firm. To what extent is there 
evidence in these encounters of bargaining skills on the part of the 
government in furthering its industrial goals7 
First of all, the firm official interviewed claimed that the 
major reason for locating upcountry was the promise of duty remission 
by the government, and that otherwise the firm would, have preferred to 
locate in Nairobi. This was also the position that the official took 
in his appeal to the I.P.C.,basically arguing that the government had 
double—crossed him by revoking his duty remission. 
Although it is obvious why he might say this in a bargaining 
situation, he was probably exaggerating. The Dame official admitted 
to me that his firm did not consider any other location except the one 
selected. Furthermore, since his family had lived and worked in that 
location for generations, it is likely that thoy would have set up this 
factory there with or without a promise of remission from the government. 
As the years went by, the firm became, in the words of the 
official interviewed, "...far more successful than we ever anticipated". 
Part of the reason for this was certainly the duty remissions. As a 
result, the company presently has plans to increase its fabric and garment 
production, and to add a spinning department, which will increase the 
99 
firm's labor force from between 300 and 900 . Because of space limitations 
at present site, the firm has acquired a new site in the same town to 
accomodate the present factory and proposed expansions. Although the 100 
firm has experienced great difficulty in doing business in this town , 
it has been decided not to move to Nairobi because of the high cost of 
moving and the presumed difficulty of recruiting and training new 
laborers there. Thus, the government has indirectly furthered its goal of 
99« The smaller figure is an estimate made by the firm to the 
government in 1975. The larger figure is the latest estimate given 
to me by the managing director in 197&* Business prospects must 
be good, to cause such an escalation of investment plans. 
100. e.g. Haw materials must come from Mombasa while 75$ of all 
finished goods are sold in Nairobi. This combined situation creates 
abnormally high transport costs, according to firm officials. Additional 
disadvantages include comparatively low labor efficiency and difficulties 
in maintaining necessary contact with Nairobi based government officials. 
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upcountry employment creation' by granting duty remission to this 
firm for an extended period, which in turn helped to make the 
firm profitable enough to contemplate a massive expansion. Cn 
the other hand, the revocation of this remission has not disrupted 
expansion plans, despite the complaints from management. Government 
negotiatora have argued that although an upcountry location put the 
firm at a disadvantage in its initial stages, the firm was compensated 
for this by eight years of duty remissions, and should now be in a 
position to survive without such a subsidy, 
In terms of the bargaining model described in 2.2, the 
government offered duty remisssion to this firm in exchange for 
employment creation in an upcountry town. However, .after eight 
years, the government decided that the arrangement no longer worked 
to the government's advantage. Although the firm threatened that 
revocation of duty remission would jeopardize up to 900 jobs, the 
government was unmoved. 
In terms of the bargaining model in Figure 4, (see 
page 36) the government was able to commit , itself to B 
(eliminfl.ting duty remissions), thus forcing the firm to choose 
between aB (expansion, no remissions) and AB (no expansion, no 
remissions). The firm chose aB as a more desirable outcome than 
AB. 
The government has a distinct bargaining advantage inherent 
in the duty remission system, because of the discretionary powers 
of government officials. Although there is no certainty that a firm 
will be granted duty remission if it is located outside of Nairobi 
101 
and Mombasa, there is a good probability of' it. Thus, many; ~ 
firms are-' willing to gamble on a location desired by the government, 
and in return expect that the government will grant favors such as 
duty remission. However, the government is under no obligation to 
grant remission, and often.does not. Thus the government can attain 
101. Duty remission may also be granted to firms located in 
Nairobi and Mombasa for other reasons such as export promotion. 
However, many firms believe that their rejjuests for duty remission 
w'ill be treated more favorabljr by the government if the firm 
selects an upcountry location favored by the government. 
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compliance with its locational objectives at less cost than if it had 
a fixed policy of automatic remission as a ,:reward" for locating in 
upcountry areas. Furthermore, the government can revoke duty remission 
on a selective basis> in contrast to other types of incentives such 102 
as tariffs which can only be revoked on an industry wide basis. Thus, 
the government does not have to continue granting remission to 
particular finns indefinitely, long after the incentive value of the 103 remission has been lost. Firms are aware of the government's 
bargaining advantage in this regard. The Textile Manufacturer's 
104 
Association has asked for the standardization of incentives, but 
so far the government has been understandibly unwilling to give up 
its discretionary power. 
5.2.2. Case No. 2: Protection and Duty Her:ssion 
It has often been observed that when foreign investors are 
dependent on government for protection, they are often eager ';o ...eui.-.rn 
105 
to secure governmentparticipation in equity, the presumption 
being that the government will then have something to lose if it 
fails to provide the requisite protection. A comparable observation 
can also be made regarding location: investors dependent on the 
government for protection will willingly locate in suboptimal locations 
in order to pl»aae the government, and thus be in a better position 
to ask for help. The extent • to which a firm roceives the help it 
expects is determinant on bargaining between firms and government 
officials. 
102. in cases where there is only one producer of products in a 
particular tariff category, such a tariff can be adjusted on a firm-
eelective basis. However, tariff categories regarding textiles in 
Kenya are broad, and generally affect goods manufactured by more'" 
than one producer. 
103. Like any system whereby government officials are granted 
discretionary power this system is open to abuses, although I 
have not found any examples of such abuses. 
04. Letter from Secretary, Textile Manufacturers' Association 
of Kenya (P.O. Box 47, Kisumu) to Dr. J.G. Kiano, Minister for 
OonmeTce and Industry, 17th May, 1975. 
KB. Leys, 1975, pp. 128-35. 
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This process is evident in the case of a recently incorporated 
upcountry mill. In the early phases of the negotiations, the investors 
was asked by the government to locate in Nakuru. Officially;, the 
reason for this was that it was one of the towns "having good access 
to the six ginneries in Western Kenya which produce two-thirds of 
the country's cotton". ^ ^ There were also obvious political reasons 
for the government's insistence on Nakuru. In any case, the investor 
conducted a detailed feasibility study based on Nakuru, and found it 
to be an ideal location. 
Then, at the last minute, the International Finance 
Corporation (i.F.C., a branch of the World Bank), one of the financial 
partners in the investment, rejected Nakuru as a location. The 
reason given was the danger that such a project would represent 
106 
to lake Nakuru, and the requisite high cost of sewerage treatment. 
Government officials initially argued that it was politically impossible 
to consider changing the location of iJhe"propbsed factory. Shortly 
thereafter top officials all of a sudden had to devote most of their 107 
efforts to solving a major political crisis. In the midst of this 
confusion, it was quietly decided to shift the location of the 
proposed factory to Eldoret. ,4 ." " 
There were political reasons for the choice of Eldoret. 
In addition, Eldoret was one of the towns recommended as a location 
for the mill by the Department of Physical Planning, Ministry of 
Lands and Settlement. This evaluation was made on the basis of 
three criteria: social need (e.g. projected excess hinterland 
population given the limited labour absorption capacity of the land), 
105a. ISPC project description: "Cotton Textile Manufacturing." 
106. Ironically, shortly after the decision was made not to locate 
the textile mill in Nakuru, another group of investors decided to 
locate a chemical factory in Nakuru. A special interministerial committee 
commissioned to investigate the factory found that the factory was 
an environmental hazard to the local ecosystem, and should therefore 
be relocated. This recommendation was accepted by the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning, and for a while it was thought that the factory 
would be relocated. However, there wass disagreement among the 
relevant ministries as to who was responsible for ordering the company 
to relocated. As a result, the factory is still located in Nakuru, 
and lias begun production. The Nation has been conducting an editorial 
campaign to have the factory relocated. The German government has 
suspend«d any further disbursements out of a loan of DM 4 million for 
the extension of the Nakuru water supply and sewerage schemes because 
of the factory. The World Wildlife Fund may rescind its agreement 
to finance the expansion of the Lake Nakuru National Park because of 
the factory. 
107. This was the period immediately following the death of J.M. Kari 
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infrastructure (existing capacity, including expansion schemes 
in an advanced design phase) and location economics (access to 
cotton growing areas) • Nakuru was rejected as a location according 
to these, as well as environmental criteria. Yet the government 
had selected Nakuru for a location without consulting tho Physical 
Planning Department, and would have kept with Nakuru had it not been 
for the insistence of the I.P.C. This case points out the weakness 
of the Physical Planning Department in the industrial location 
process. Although technically the director of this department 
should be a member of the Now Projects Committee (an interministerial 
group that approves new investments) and thus involved in decisions 
on industrial location, in fact he is almost never invited to the 
meetings of this committee. The reason for this is apparently that 
industrial location is considered too politically sensitive an 
issue to be left to the objective constraints of regional and town 
planning. 
In any case, firm officials have encountered serious 
problems as a result of their locating in Eldoret. The town council 
has not been able to supply water and effluent facilities in 
accordance with the agreed upon timetable. A generator had to be 
imported because of delays in hooking up tho regular electricity 
supply. Problems have been encountered in'obtaining competant 
laborers. Skilled laborers such as carpenters, electricians, and 
accountants are particularly scarce. Never the leas, the firm is 
confident that it can make a profit, despite these ana other 
disadvantages, as long as the government provides the requisite 
protection. 
The firm ha3 requested various types of protection which 
can be placed in two categories. First of all,' the firm has aaked 
for increased levels of protection for the entire industry. 
Quotas should be placed on fabric imports, on imports of both 
new and second hand clothing. Imports of prints and • 
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1 08 fabrics below the CIP value of 10/- per sq. meter should be stopped. 
A second category of protection sought by the firm would 
protect it from domestic competitors with lower depreciation costs 
and a more experienced labor force. This protection would include 
duty remission on imported machinery, and on all raw materials for 
eight years from the date of start of production. The firm also 
asked for an eight year exemption from the Kshs. -/30 per sq. meter . 
excise duty charged to other local textile producers. 
Since the firm is not yet into production, it has not been 
officially given remission on imported raw materials, although both 
firm and government officials forsee no problems in obtaining it. 
The matter of import quotas is up in the air at the moment, although 
firm officials are confident that the .-requisite quotas will be 
enacted. The government officials interviewed all said that an excise 
tax exemption for the firm was out of the question. 
However, the firm has been exempted from fiscal entry, import 
duty and suspended fiscal entry on materials used in the construction 
and operation of the mill. This includes all "building and processing 
materials, equipment, machinery, spare parts, and fuel which, in the 
opinion of the Commissioner General of Customs and Excise, are -not 
108. The firm asked the government to limit imports and East African 
Community transfers of fabrics to 12 million meters per annum (cf. 
in 1974, almost 28 million meters were imported or transferred according 
to official statistics, which probably understates actual levels of 
imports) Imports of ready made garments should not exceed Kshs. 40 
million CIP (cf in 1974 garments were imported worth Kshs. 108 million 
CIP including duty) and imports of second hand clothing should be 
limited to Ksho. 10 million (Cf. in 1974 second hand clothing imports 
were worth Kshs. 44 million CIP including duty). The firm asked for 
a complete ban on imports of prints, and .fabrios below a CIP value 
of 10/- per square meter. The latter is a particularly sensitive 
issue to this and other textile firms in Kenya. Due to the dispressed 
condition of the world textile market, these has been considerable 
dumping of textiles in Kenya at prices below tho cost of raw materials. 
For example, during June, 1975 over 3 million units (meters/yards) 
of cloth officially entered Kenya at a CIP value of between Kshs. 
2/13 and 5/60 per unit. There has also been a large quantity of cloth 
smuggled in from Tanzania and Uganda at comparable prices. 
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produced in sufficient quantity or quality in Kenya. The remission 
order as published in the Gazette stated that comparable remission had 
been granted to all textile manufacturers on 11th June 1975. However, 
there is no mention of such remission in the Gazette on that date. 
Thus, it appears that the firm has been offered a substantial 
incentive by the government which has not been offered to other firms. 
5.3 Conclusion 
On the basis of our admittedly limited sample, what can we 
conclude about the role of government in industrial location? 
In section 4, we concluded that location decisions in the 
Kenyan textile industry are based on limited criteria which are 
viewed as location related. Firms generally select the first location 
found which satisfies these criteria. On this basis, a number of 
textile firms have decided to locate outside of Nairobi and Mombasa, 
generally in one of the intermediate sized towns. These firms have 
all been able to compete successfully with firms based in Nairobi and 
Mombasa. Many of them have expanded their operations, or are planning 
an expansion. 
Thus, if the government desires to influence location 
decisions, it should determine the critical locational criteria 
of potential investors, make the investor aware of potential locations 
y 
which satisfy these criteria, and apply pressure in bargaining with 
firms to see that the location is selected. 
We have suggested that pressure applied by the government 
on firms during negotiations has had more influence on locational. 
decisions than fixed incentives such as investment credit. We have 
given examples of two cases in which the government successfully 
influenced location decisions during such negotiations. In the 
first case, the location was initially selocted by the firm, but 
the viability of the firm and its subsequent expansion was insured 
109. GK 1975 legal notice No. 29 dated 6th February. 
110. Admittedly, the 10$ tariff on capital equipment only came 
into effect on 12th June, 1975, and hence did not affect the firm's 
competitors up to that time. 
-
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by duty remissions. In the second case, the location was selected 
by the government, and the firm was "rewarded" for agreeing to 
locate there' by duty remissions. 
We do not mean to imply here that duty remissions in 
particular should be offered to firms which locate outside of 
Nairobi and Mombasa. Duty remissions may create distortions in the 
economy which outweigh any possible benefits. They tend to encourage 
the establishment of firms relying on imported inputs which in turn 
act to discourage the production of local inputs, and create a 
drain on scarce foreign exchange. 
However, there are other incentives which may be granted 
to firms on a negotiated basis, including foreign investment protection 
local credit from commercial or governmental sources, equity partici-
pation, export incentives, work permits for expatriates, etc. Firms 
are likely to accept reasonable suggestions from the government 
concerning location, in return for favorable treatment regarding 
negotiated incentives. 
The government might also consider setting up an 
industrial liconsing system, by which it could influence the 
location both of new firms and of expansions of existing firms. 
Currontly, an investor may set up a new factory and/or expand an 
existing one anywhere he pleases (subject to local community 
regulations and to registration by the Registrar of Companies, 
Office of the Attorney General if a new firm) without notifying 
the Ministry of Corxiercc and Industry, Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, and Department of Physical Planning. Thus, the agencies 
of government responsible for industrial planning may have no 
knowledge of or influence over the location of certain major invest-
ments until the particulars of the investment are publicly announced 
as a fait accompli.. Granted, any investor desiring protection, duty 
remission, government equity and loan participation, and other such 
negotiable incentives must obtain the approval of one or more of the 
intcrministerial committees. In such cases, government planners can 
influence location decisions., as explained in 5.2. 
However, a carefully designed and managed industrial 
licensing system could allow government planner's to influence and 
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monitor location decisions concerning all major industrial invest-
ments. 
Finally, we must emphasize again the significant role that 
has been and should continue to be played by the Industrial Survey 
and Promotion Centre in facilitating the location of new industrial 
projects in the intermediate sized towns. Many of the firm officials 
interviewed mentioned the invaluable assistance of this center in 
facilitating location outside of Nairobi. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
At the midpoint of this research protect, all of our preliminary 
findings-must be treated with a healthy skepticism. Never the less, by way of 
summary, it is useful to list these tentative conclusions. 
First of all, the government had exerted a powerful influence 
over the location of textile firms. This influence is primarily the result not 
of explicit locational incentives, but rather of a situation whereby firms are 
dependent on the government for certain concessions, particularly regarding 
duty remission and protection. Such firms are willing to locate in suboptinial 
locations in order to please the government, and thus be in a better 
position to ask for help. We exoect to find the same behavior in other 
protected industries, and/or in industries dependent on imported inputs. 
Second, in a small developing country, the difference to a firm 
whose products are sold in a protected market between an optimal location 
and sub-optimal location is often slight. Admittedly, there may be 
disadvantages to an upcountry location such as increased transport costs, 
inadequate infrastructure and difficulties in communication with Nairobi 
based government officials. However, the fact that many of the firms in 
our sample are currently undergoing or contemplating expansion indicates that 
the locational disadvantages are not severe. 
Futrthermore, we have shown that firms tend to select the first location 
found which satisfied certain minimal criteria. Firms believe that once such 
a location has been found, it is not worth the time and expense of searching 
for other locations, since the possible advantages of such a location would 
be marginal. In all cases examined where the government has suggested such 
a location, the concerned firm has gone along with the suggestion, both in 
order to please the government as mentioned abo-ve, and to save itself the bother 
of finding a marginally better location. 
Thus, the government has a notentially strong bargaining positio 
from which to attain locational objectives. Aside from the fact that the 
firms interviewed were anxious to please the government by selecting a recom-
mended location which may have been marginally sub-optimal, the government's 
objective of industrial location outside of Nairobi and Mombasa is, in 
bargaining terms, a orominent, distinguishable outcome. That is, since the 
government's hroad locational objective is unambiguous, and since nost firms 
have no comparably clear cut locatinnal criteria, tha government is in strong 
position to enforce its will. 
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The question which remians is given the fact that tsxtile firms 
have successfully located in intermediate sized towns on their own volition 
and/or at the prodding of the government, why are there so few other firms 
that have done so? '.flay is it that employment opportunities are proportionately 
increasing in Nairobi and Thika but decreasing in other towns, despite the 
government's expressed intention of industrial decentralization? 
There are a number of possible explanations that appear to be valid 
at this point, and that will be subject to further testing during the 
remainder of this research project: 
1) Increasing employment imbalances between Nairobi and Thika on 
the one hand and other towns on the other can be partially 
explained by the expansion of existing factories in Nairobi and 
Thika, and by the development of new firms as a result of 
backward and forward linkages with existing firms .in these towns. 
2) Although the government's goal of industrial decentralization 
is "promiment and distinguishable" .in particular bargaining 
encounters, there is no detailed statement of this policy and its 
implications for the day to day operations of each ministry. Thus, 
there is no explicit set of procedures for applying systematic 
on investors to locate in les.s developed towns. Such-.pressure pressure//night be most effectively applied form an office of 
industrial location, situated either in the Ministry of Commerce 
& Industry or the Ministry of Finance & Planning . Because of 
the absence of a clearly spelled out locational policy, many firms 
are effectively left to their own devices concerning location. 
Most of these firms end up locating in Nairobi and the peri-urban 
area or Thika, 'because of personal considerations, the ready 
market, developed infrastructure and/or the need for maintaining 
contacts with government officials. 
3) Although the stated government policy has been to give priority 
in the allocation of development funds from the national 
treasury for services and infrastructure to intermediate sized 
towns which are designated as growth centers, a disproportionately 
111. A model for such an office could be the Kenyanization Bureau, Ministry 
of Labour, which has effectively Pu_t pressure on firms to hire an increasing 
proportion of Kenyans. 
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large share (42.7%) of projected public investments in "urban 
112 
main infrastructure" for 1974/78 is allocated to Nairobi 
This unwillingness to commit such funds to the intermediate sized 
towns retards the growth of.existing industries in these towns, 113 and is an obstacle to the location of new industries. 
4) Although the government has been successful in attracting textile 
firms to upcountry locations, there is little indication 
that the firms have generated significant backward or forward 
linkanges in their respective regions. Granted, the presence of 
large textile mills in relatively small towns has necessitated 
some improvements in banking and municipal services. However, 
there is little evidence of the growth of activities that one 
would expect to find associated with large textile factories such 
as engineering services, and machinery repair on the one hand 
114 
and clothing manufacturing on the other. The reasons for this 
situation are complex, ranging from problems common to most 
developing countries such as the shortage of technical expertise, 
to problems peculiar to Kenya such as a political economy which 
tends to favor large as opposed to small industrial projects. 
The result of this situation is that although the government 
has been successful in attracting large texti3.e projects to 
intermediate sized towns, these oi-'ojects have achieved much less 
than might be expected towards alleviating the highly 'uneven 
pattern of modernization in Kenya. If we can discover with greater 
112. GK, 1974, Vol. 1, o. 123. As additional evidence of expenditure 
imbalance, 51.5% of projected expenditures on infrastructure for the six largest 
towns (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldorjt and Thisa) is allocated to 
Nairobi. 
113. One of the textile firms interviewed was promised water and sewarage 
facilities by a certain date. However, none of the governmental parties 
involved - the municipal council and the relevant ministries - would agree 
to finance it. The result was considerable delay and aggravation. This type 
of problem appears to be a common one outside of Nairobi, Mombasa and Thika. 
114. For exanple, one upcountry firm told us that theirweaving operating 
had not been profitable. Tnev have tried to promote the system here which 
exists in some parts of India, whereby cloth is produced in small (20-40 loom) 
mills located in rural areas, under the overall supervision of roving technical 
consultants. They claim that they have tried to interest the Kenya government 
in backing such an undertaking, but without success. The same firm pointed cut 
that there was a need for better machine shops. Local machine shops are 
allegedly so inefficient and poorly organized that it is faster and cheaper for 
the firm to air freight such work to Europe. 
Another upcountry firm said that it has tried to interest the 
government and/or a local entrepreneur in starting up a small^ million Kshs.) 
trouser factory in the same town, which would use suiting material produced by 
the firm. Tho firm has offered to provide free techinical assistance, but 
so far there have been no takers. 
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-recision the extent to which this problem exists regarding textile and other 
large industrial projects, and the reasons for it, we will be in a better 
oosition to explain existing employment imbalances in Kenya. 
Io- a future Daper, all four of these explanations will be examined 
rich- ^  view towards recommending appropriate policies to redress employment 
imbalances. 
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